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We extend the basic (representative-household) New Keynesian [NK] model
of the monetary transmission mechanism to allow for a spread between the in-
terest rate available to savers and borrowers, that can vary for either exogenous
or endogenous reasons. We find that the mere existence of a positive average
spread makes little quantitative difference for the predicted effects of particular
policies. Variation in spreads over time is of greater significance, with conse-
quences both for the equilibrium relation between the policy rate and aggregate
expenditure and for the relation between real activity and inflation.
Nonetheless, we find that the target criterion – a linear relation that should
be maintained between the inflation rate and changes in the output gap — that
characterizes optimal policy in the basic NK model continues to provide a good
approximation to optimal policy, even in the presence of variations in credit
spreads. We also consider a “spread-adjusted Taylor rule,” in which the inter-
cept of the Taylor rule is adjusted in proportion to changes in credit spreads.
We show that while such an adjustment can improve upon an unadjusted Tay-
lor rule, the optimal degree of adjustment is less than 100 percent; and even
with the correct size of adjustment, such a rule of thumb remains inferior to
the targeting rule.
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It is common for theoretical evaluations of alternative monetary policies — most
notably, the literature that provides theoretical foundations for inflation targeting —
to be conducted using models of the monetary transmission mechanism that abstract
altogether from financial frictions.1 There is generally assumed to be a single interest
rate — “the interest rate” — that is at once the policy rate that constitutes the
operating target for the central bank, the rate of return that all households and firms
receive on savings, and the rate at which anyone can borrow against future income.
In models with more complete theoretical foundations, this is justified by assuming
frictionless financial markets, in which all interest rates (of similar maturity) must be
equal in order for arbitrage opportunities not to exist. It is also common to assume a
representative household, and firms that maximize the value of their earnings streams
to that household, so that there is no need for credit flows in equilibrium in any event;
such models imply that a breakdown of credit markets would have no allocative
significance. Many of the quantitative DSGE models recently developed in central
banks and other policy institutions share these features.2
Such models abstract from important complications of actual economies, even
those that are financially quite sophisticated. Sizeable spreads exist, on average, be-
tween different interest rates; moreover, these spreads are not constant over time,
especially in periods of financial stress. And “tighter” financial conditions, indicated
by increases in the size of credit spreads, are commonly associated with lower levels
of real expenditure and employment. This poses obvious questions for the practical
application of much work in the theory of monetary policy.3 If a model is to be cali-
brated or estimated using time series data, which actual interest rate should be taken
to correspond to “the interest rate” in the model? When the model is used to to give
advice about how interest rates should respond to a particular type of shock, which
actual interest rate (if any) should be made to respond in the way that “the interest
rate” does in the model? How large an error is likely to be made by abstracting from
credit frictions, with regard to the model’s predictions for the variables that appear
in it? Moreover, some questions clearly cannot even be addressed using models that
abstract from credit frictions. Most notably, how should a central bank respond to a
“financial shock” that increases the size of the spreads resulting from credit frictions?
This paper seeks to address these questions by presenting a simple extension of
1See, for example, Clarida et al., (1999) or Woodford (2003), among many other references.
2The models of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) provide an especially influential example.
3The current generation of DSGE models has been criticized on this ground by Issing (2006) and
Goodhart (2007), among others.
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the basic “New Keynesian” model (as developed, for example, in Woodford, 2003)
in which a credit friction is introduced, allowing for a time-varying wedge between
the interest rate available to households on their savings and the interest rate at
which it is possible to borrow. Financial intermediation matters for the allocation
of resources due to the introduction of heterogeneity in the spending opportunities
currently available to different households. While the model remains highly stylized,
it has the advantage of nesting the basic New Keynesian model (extensively used in
normative monetary policy analysis) as a special case, and of introducing only a small
number of additional parameters, the consequences of which for conclusions about
the monetary transmission mechanism and the character of optimal policy can be
thoroughly explored. The approach taken also seeks to develop a tractable model,
with as small a state space as is consistent with an allowance for financial frictions
and heterogeneity, and hence only modestly greater complexity than the basic New
Keynesian model.
Among the questions to be addressed are the following: If the parameters deter-
mining the degree of heterogeneity and the size of credit frictions are calibrated so
as to match both the volume of bank credit and the spread between bank deposit
and lending rates in the US economy, how much of a difference does this make (rel-
ative to the frictionless baseline) for the model’s predictions for the response of the
economy to various types of shocks, under a given monetary policy rule? How much
of a difference does it make for the implied responses to real disturbances under an
optimal monetary policy? How much of a difference does it make for the form of
the quadratic stabilization objective that would correspond to the maximization of
average expected utility? How much of a difference does it make for the form of the
optimal target criterion for monetary stabilization policy? And how should policy
optimally respond to a “financial shock”?
The model also provides perspective on “rules of thumb” for policy in times of
financial turmoil proposed in the recent literature. For example, McCulley and Toloui
(2008) and Taylor (2008) propose that the intercept term in a “Taylor rule” for
monetary policy should be adjusted downward in proportion to observed increases in
spreads.4 Here we use our simple model to ask whether it is correct to say that the
4Similarly, Meyer and Sack (2008) propose, as a possible account of recent U.S. Federal Reserve
policy, a Taylor rule in which the intercept — representing the Fed’s view of “the equilibrium real
funds rate” — has been adjusted downward in response to credit market turmoil, and use the size of
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“natural” or “neutral” rate of interest is lower when credit spreads increase (assuming
unchanged fundamentals otherwise), and to the extent that it is, how the size of the
change in the natural rate compares to the size of the change in credit spreads.
We also ask whether it is approximately correct to say that a proper response to
a “financial shock” is to conduct policy according to the same rule as under other
circumstances, except with the operating target for the policy rate adjusted by a
factor that is proportional to the increase in credit spreads; and again, to the extent
that such an approximation is used, we ask what proportion of adjustment should be
made.
Other authors have argued that if financial disturbances are an important source
of macroeconomic instability, a sound approach to monetary policy will have to pay
attention to the balance sheets of financial intermediaries. It is sometimes suggested
that policy should respond to variations in the growth rate of monetary or credit
aggregates, rather than — as in the case of both the Taylor rule and conventional
prescriptions for “flexible inflation targeting” — seeking to determine the appropriate
level of short-term interest rates purely on the basis of observations of or projections
for measures of inflation and real activity. Here we consider two possible interpre-
tations of such proposals: as an argument for targeting monetary and/or credit ag-
gregates, or at least adopting a target criterion that involves such variables along
with others; or as an argument for their special value as indicators, so that such vari-
ables should receive substantial weight in the central bank’s reaction function. We
address the first issue by deriving an optimal target criterion for monetary policy,
under certain simplifying assumptions, and seeing to what extent it involves either
money or credit. We address the second issue, under assumptions that are arguably
more realistic, by computing the optimal responses to shocks, and asking what kinds
of indicator variables would allow a simple rule of thumb to bring about equilibrium
responses of this kind.
Of course, we are not the first to investigate ways in which New Keynesian [NK]
models can be extended to allow for financial frictions of one type or another. A
number of authors have analyzed DSGE models with financial frictions of one type or
another.5 Many of the best-known contributions introduce obstacles to the willingness
increases in spreads in early 2008 as a basis for a proposed magnitude of the appropriate adjustment.
5Probably the most influential early example was the model of Bernanke et al., (1999). More
recent contributions include Christiano et al. (2003, 2007a, 2007b), Gertler et al. (2007), and
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of savers to lend to borrowers, but assume that borrowers directly borrow from the
suppliers of savings. A number of recent papers, however, are like ours in explicitly
introducing intermediaries and allowing for a spread between the interest received by
savers and that paid by borrowers; examples include Hulsewig et al. (2007), Teranishi
(2008), Sudo and Teranishi (2008), and Gerali et al. (2008).6
In general, these models have been fairly complex, in the interest of quantitative
realism, and the results obtained are purely numerical. Our aim here is somewhat
different. While the interest of such analyses is clear, especially to policy institutions
seeking quantitative estimates of the effects of particular contemplated actions, we
believe that it is also valuable to seek analytical insights of the kind that can only
be obtained from analyses of simpler, more stylized models. Here we focus on the
consequences for monetary policy analysis of two basic features of economies — het-
erogeneity of non-financial economic units, of a kind that gives the financial sector a
non-trivial role in the allocation of resources; and costs of financial intermediation,
that may be subject to random variation for reasons relating largely to developments
in the financial sector — in the simplest possible setting, where we do not introduce
other departures from the basic NK model.
Two recent contributions have aims more closely related to ours. Like us, Good-
friend and McCallum (2007) consider a fairly simple NK model, with new model
elements limited to those necessary to allow for multiple interest rates with different
average levels (including, like us, a distinction between bank lending rates and the
policy rate).7 As in the present paper, a primary goal is to “investigate quantitatively
how much a central bank can be misled by relying on a [NK] model without money
and banking when managing its interbank-rate policy instrument” (p. xx). De Fiore
and Tristani (2007) also propose a simple generalization of the basic NK model in
order to introduce a distinction between loan rates and the policy; also like us, they
Iacoviello (2005). Faia and Monacelli (2007) consider how two different types of financial frictions
affect welfare-based policy evaluation, though from a perspective somewhat different than the one
taken here; they compare alternative simple rules, rather than computing optimal policy, as we do,
and compute the welfare associated with a particular rule under a complete specification of shocks,
rather than considering what a given simple rule implies about the equilibrium responses to shocks
considered individually. Cu´rdia (2008) considers optimal policy in the spirit of the present paper,
but in a more complex model with features specific to emerging-market economies.
6See Gerali et al. (2008, sec. 2) for a more detailed discussion of prior literature.
7This paper provides a quantitative analysis of type of model first proposed by Goodfriend (2005).
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consider how financial frictions affect the “natural rate of interest,” and the role of
such a concept in inflation determination in an economy with credit frictions.
The approaches taken by these authors nonetheless differ from ours in important
respects. In particular, unlike us, Goodfriend and McCallum assume a representative-
household model; as a consequence, financial intermediation matters for resource
allocation in their model only because they assume that certain liabilities of banks
(transactions balances) play a crucial role in facilitating transactions. We instead
treat the fact that some (but not all) financial intermediaries finance (some) of their
lending by providing accounts that are useful as means of payment as inessential to
the primary function of financial intermediaries in the economy; and in our model,
for the sake of simplicity, we assume that intermediaries finance themselves entirely
by issuing deposits that supply no transactions services at all (so that in equilibrium,
deposits must pay the same interest rate as government debt). De Fiore and Tristani
instead have two types of infinite-lived agents (“households” and “entrepreneurs,”
following Bernanke et al., 1999), one of which saves while the other borrows; but
in their model, unlike ours, agents belong permanently to one of these categories,
and one is tempted to identify the division between them with the division between
households and firms in the flow of funds accounts. This would be desirable, of course,
if one thought that the model did adequately capture the nature of that division, as
the model would yield additional testable predictions. But in fact, there are both
saving units and borrowing units at a given point in time, both in the household
sector and in the firm sector; and a saving unit at one point in time need not be
a saving unit forever. We accordingly prefer not to introduce a distinction between
households and firms (or “households” and “entrepreneurs”) at all, and also not to
assume that the identities of our savers and borrowers are permanent.8 In addition,
De Fiore and Tristani, like Goodfriend and McCallum, assume that money must be
used in (some) transactions, while we abstract from transactions frictions of this kind
altogether in order to simplify our analysis.9
8In fact, De Fiore and Tristani list as an important “undesirable property” of their model the fact
that in it, “households and entrepreneurs are radically different agents” (p. 23), as the predicted
equilibrium behavior of “households” as a group does not look much like that of the aggregate
household sector in actual economies.
9Goodfriend and McCallum justify the introduction of a cash-in-advance constraint in their
model, stating (footnote 6) that “medium-of-exchange money is implicitly central to our analysis
because it is by managing the aggregate quantity of reserves, which banks hold to facilitate trans-
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We develop our model in section 1, and compare its structure with that of the
basic NK model. We then consider, in section 2, the implications of the model for
the equilibrium effects of a variety of types of exogenous disturbances, under a given
assumption about monetary policy (such as that it conform to a “Taylor rule”), and
ask to what extent the basic NK model gives incorrect answers to these questions.
Section 3 considers optimal monetary policy in the context of our model, defined to
mean a policy that maximizes the average expected utility of households, and again
considers how different the conclusions are from those derived from the basic NK
model. We also consider the extent to which various simple rules of thumb, such as
versions of the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), can usefully approximate optimal policy.
Section 4 summarizes our conclusions.
1 A New Keynesian Model with Financial Fric-
tions
Here we sketch a model that introduces heterogeneity of the kind needed in order for
financial intermediation to matter for resource allocation, and a limit on the degree
of intermediation that occurs in equilibrium, with a minimum of structure. We stress
the similarity between the model presented here and the basic New Keynesian [NK]
model, and show how the standard model is recovered as a special case of the one
developed here. This sets the stage for a quantitative investigation of the degree to
which credit frictions of an empirically realistic magnitude change the predictions of
the model.
actions, that monetary policy affects interest rates.” However, while in their model, banks hold
reserves at the central bank only because of a reserve requirement proportional to transactions bal-
ances, this need not be true in actual economies, a number of which (such as Canada) have abolished
reserve requirements. Moreover, it is possible in principle for a central bank to control the interest
rate in the interbank market for central-bank deposits without there being any demand for such
reserves other than as a riskless store of value, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 2). Hence
there is no need to introduce a demand for money for transactions purposes in our model, in order
for it to be possible to suppose that the central bank controls a short-term nominal interest rate,
that will correspond to the rate at which banks can fund themselves.
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1.1 Financial Frictions and Aggregate Demand
We depart from the assumption of a representative household in the standard model,
by supposing that households differ in the utility that they obtain from current ex-







uτ t(i) (ct(i); ξt)−
∫ 1
0
v (ht (j; i) ; ξt) dj
]
,
where τ t (i) ∈ {b, s} indicates the household’s “type” in period t. Here ub(c; ξ) and
us(c; ξ) are two different period utility functions, each of which may also be shifted by
the vector of aggregate taste shocks ξt. As in the basic NK model, there is assumed
to be a continuum of differentiated goods, each produced by a monopolistically com-
petitive supplier; ct(i) is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggegator of the household’s purchases of
these differentiated goods. The household similarly supplies a continuum of different
types of specialized labor, indexed by j, that are hired by firms in different sectors of
the economy; the additively separable disutility of work v(h; ξ) is the same for each
type of labor, and can be shifted by the taste shock.10
Each agent’s type τ t(i) evolves as an independent two-state Markov chain. Specif-
ically, we assume that each period, with probability 1 − δ (for some 0 ≤ δ < 1) an
event occurs which results in a new type for the household being drawn; otherwise it
remains the same as in the previous period. When a new type is drawn, it is b with
probability pib and s with probability pis, where 0 < pib, pis < 1, pib + pis = 1. (Hence
the population fractions of the two types are constant at all times, and equal to piτ
for each type τ .) We assume moreover that
ubc(c; ξ) > u
s
c(c; ξ)
for all levels of expenditure c in the range that occur in equilibrium. (See Figure 1,
where these functions are graphed in the case of the calibration discussed below.11
Hence a change in a household’s type changes its relative impatience to consume,12)
10As in Woodford (2003), the vector ξt may contain multiple elements, which may or may not be
correlated with one another, so that the notation makes no assumption about correlation between
disturbances to the utility of consumption and disturbances to the disutility of work.
11In the equilibrium discussed below, in the case of small enough disturbances, equilibrium con-
sumption by the two types varies in neighborhoods of the two values c¯b and c¯s shown in the figure.
12As explained below, all households have the same expectations regarding their marginal utilities
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given the aggregate state ξt; in addition, the current impatience to consume of all
households is changed by the aggregate disturbance ξt.
The coexistence of the two types with differing impatience to consume creates
a social function for financial intermediation. In the present model, as in the basic
New Keynesian model, all output is consumed either by households or by the gov-
ernment;13 hence intermediation serves an allocative function only to the extent that
there are reasons for the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of households
to differ in the absence of financial flows. The present model reduces to the standard
representative-household model in the case that one assumes that ub(c; ξ) = us(c; ξ).
We shall assume that most of the time, households are able to spend an amount
different from their current income only by depositing funds with or borrowing from
financial intermediaries, and that the same nominal interest rate is available to all
savers, and that a (possibly) different nominal interest is available to all borrowers,14
independent of the quantities that a given household chooses to save or to borrow.
(For simplicity, we shall also assume in the present exposition that only one-period
riskless nominal contracts with the intermediary are possible for either savers or
borrowers.) The assumption that households cannot engage in financial contracting
other than through the intermediary sector introduces the financial friction with
which the paper is concerned.
Our analysis is simplified (though this may not be immediately apparent!) by
of expenditure far in the future. Hence if type b households have a higher current marginal utility of
expenditure, they also have a higher valuation of current (marginal) expenditure relative to future
expenditure; thus we may say that they are more impatient to consume.
13The “consumption” variable is therefore to be interpreted as representing all of private expendi-
ture, not only consumer expenditure. In reality, one of the most important reasons for some economic
units to wish to borrow from others is that the former currently have access to profitable investment
opportunities. Here we treat these opportunities as if they were opportunities to consume, in the
sense that we suppose that the expenditure opportunities are valuable to the household, but we
abstract from any consequences of current expenditure for future productivity. For discussion of
the interpretation of “consumption” in the basic New Keynesian model, see Woodford (2003, pp.
242-243).
14Here “savers” and “borrowers” identify households according to whether they choose to save or
borrow, and not by their “type”. We assume that at any time, each household is able to save or
borrow (or both at once, though it would never make sense to do so) at market interest rates. In
the equilibrium described below, it turns out that a household i borrows in period t if and only if
τ t(i) = b, but this is a consequence of optimization rather than an implication of a participation
constraint.
8
allowing for an additional form of financial contracting. We assume that households
are able to sign state-contingent contracts with one another, through which they may
insure one another against both aggregate risk and the idiosyncratic risk associated
with a household’s random draw of its type, but that households are only intermit-
tently able to receive transfers from the insurance agency; between the infrequent
occasions when a household has access to the insurance agency, it can only save or
borrow through the financial intermediary sector mentioned in the previous para-
graph. The assumption that households are eventually able to make transfers to one
another in accordance with an insurance contract signed earlier means that despite
our assumption of infinite-lived households, households’ respective marginal utilities
of income do not eventually become more and more dispersed as a result of their dif-
fering individual type histories. This facilitates aggregation (so that our model still
has a low-dimensional state space), and allows us to obtain stationary equilibrium
fluctuations and to use local methods to characterize them. At the same time, the
fact that households may go for years without access to insurance transfers means
that there remains a non-trivial financial friction for the banking sector to partially
mitigate.15
To simplify the presentation, we assume here that the random dates on which
a given household i has access to the insurance agency are the same dates as those
on which it draws a new type. Thus with probability δ each period, household i is
unable to receive any insurance transfer in the current period, and also retains the
same type as in the previous period. With probability 1−δ, it learns at the beginning
of the period that it has access to the insurance agency. In this case, it receives a net
transfer Tt(i) (under the terms of an insurance contract signed far in the past), that
may depend on the history of aggregate disturbances through the current period, and
also on i’s type history through the previous period (but not on its type in period t,
which is not yet known). After receiving the insurance transfer, household i learns its
new type (an independent drawing as explained above), and then makes its spending,
saving and borrowing decisions as in any other period, but taking into account its
15A similar device is commonly used in models of “liquidity,” where access to frictionless financial
intermediation is assumed to be possible only at discrete points in time, and that only a smaller
class of exchanges are possible at interim dates. See, e.g., Lucas and Stokey (1984), Lucas (1990),
Fuerst (1992), or Lagos and Wright (2005). Here we use a similar device to facilitate aggregation,
but without doing so in a way that implies that the allocative consequences of financial frictions are
extremely transitory.
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new type and its post-transfer financial wealth.
Household i’s beginning-of-period (post-transfer) nominal net financial wealth
At(i) is then given by
At(i) = [Bt−1(i)]
+ (1 + idt−1)+ [Bt−1(i)]− (1 + ibt−1)+Dintt + Tt(i), (1.1)
where Bt−1(i) is the household’s nominal net financial wealth at the end of period
t− 1;
[B]+ ≡ max (B, 0) , [B]− ≡ min (B, 0) ;
idt is the (one-period, riskless nominal) interest rate that savers receive at the be-
ginning of period t + 1 on their savings deposited with intermediaries at the end of
period t, while ibt is the interest rate at which borrowers are correspondingly able to
borrow from intermediaries in period t for repayment at the beginning of period t+1;
and Dintt represents the distributed profits of the financial intermediary sector. We
assume that each household owns an equal share in the intermediary sector,16 and so
receives an equal share of the distributed profits each period; profits are distributed
each period as soon as the previous period’s loans and depositors are repaid. Note
that the final term Tt(i) is necessarily equal to zero in any period in which household
i does not have access to the insurance agency. A household’s end-of-period nominal
net financial wealth Bt(i) is correspondingly given by
Bt(i) = At(i)− Ptct(i) +
∫
Wt(j)ht(j; i)dj +Dt + T
g
t , (1.2)
where Pt is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index in period t (and hence the price of the
composite consumption good); Wt(j) is the wage of labor of type j in period t; Dt
represents the household’s share in the distributed profits of goods-producing firms;
and T gt is the net nominal (lump-sum) government transfer received by each household
in period t.
Any pair of identically situated households with access to the insurance agency
will contract with one another so that if, in any state of the world at some future
date, they again each have access to the insurance agency at the same time, a transfer
16We do not allow trading in the shares of intermediaries, in order to simplify the discussion of
households’ saving and borrowing decisions. Euler equations of the form (1.12)–(1.13) below would
still apply, however, even if households could also trade the shares of either banks or goods-producing
firms.
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will take place between them that equalizes their marginal utilities of income at that
time (if each has behaved optimally in the intervening periods). Given that they
have identical continuation problems at that time (before learning their new types),
as functions of their post-transfer financial wealths, such an agreement will ensure
that their post-transfer financial wealths are identical (again, if each has behaved
optimally17). If we suppose that at some time in the past, all households originally
started with identical financial wealth and access to the insurance agency, then they
should have contracted so that in equilibrium, in each period t, all those households
with access to the insurance agency in period t will obtain identical post-transfer
financial wealth. If we suppose, finally, that transfers through the insurance agency
must aggregate to zero each period (because the agency does not accumulate financial
assets or borrow), then each household with access to the insurance agency at the
beginning of period t must have post-transfer wealth equal to
At(i) = At ≡
∫
At(h)dh. (1.3)
The beginning-of-period wealth of households who do not have access to the insurance
agency is instead given by (1.1), with Tt(i) set equal to zero.
If we let dt denote aggregate real deposits with financial intermediaries at the end










where Bt is the set of households i for which At(i) < 0, St is the (complementary) set
of households for which At(i) ≥ 0, and bgt is real government debt at the end of period
t. We assume that government debt is held directly by savers, rather than by financial
intermediaries, so that the rate of return that must be paid on government debt is
17It is important to note, however, that the contractual transfer Tt(i) is only contingent on the
history of aggregate and individual-specific exogenous states, and not on the actual wealth that
household i has at the beginning of period t. Thus a spendthrift household is not insured an equal
post-transfer wealth as other households, regardless of how much it has spent in past periods.
18Here “real” deposits and other real variables are measured in units of the Dixit-Stiglitz composite
consumption good, the price of which is Pt. Deposit contracts, loan contracts, and government debt
are actually all assumed to be non-state-contingent nominal contracts. We introduce real measures
of the volume of financial intermediation because we assume that the intermediation technology
specifies real costs of a given volume of real lending.
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idt , the rate paid on deposits at the intermediaries. (For simplicity, we assume here
that all government debt also consists of riskless, one-period nominal bonds, so that
deposits and government debt are perfect substitutes.) The aggregate beginning-of-
period assets At of households referred to in (1.3) are then given by




t−1)− bt−1(1 + ibt−1)]Pt−1 +Dintt , (1.4)
integrating (1.1) over all households i.






t−1)/Πt +Gt + T
g
t /Pt − τ tYt, (1.5)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross rate of inflation, Gt is government purchases of the
composite good, τ t is a proportional tax on sales of goods,
19 and Yt is the quantity
of the composite good produced by firms. Given the sales tax, the distributed profits
of firms are equal to





ht(j; i)di is aggregate labor hired of type j.
We assume an intermediation technology in which real lending in the amount bt
requires an intermediary to obtain real deposits of a quantity
dt = bt + Ξt(bt), (1.7)
where Ξt(b) is a (possibly time-varying) function satisfying Ξt(0) = 0 and Ξt(b) ≥
0,Ξ′t(b) ≥ 0,Ξ′′t (b) ≥ 0 for all b ≥ 0. The first term on the right-hand side represents
the funds that the intermediary lends to its borrowers, while Ξt(bt) represents a real
resource cost of loan origination and monitoring.20 (The quantities in (1.7) should
19Note that there are two potential sources of government revenue in our model: variation in the
size of the net lump-sum transfers T gt , and variation in the tax rate τ t. We introduce the process
{τ t} as an additional source of time-varying supply-side distortions.
20This real resource cost can be interpreted in either of two ways: either as a quantity of the
composite produced good that is used in the activity of banking, or as a quantity of a distinct type
of labor that happens to be a perfect substitute for consumption in the utility of households (so
that the value of this labor requirement in units of the composite good is exogenously given). The
interpretation that is chosen does not affect the validity of the equations given here, though it affects
the interpretation of variables such as “ct” in terms of the quantities measured in national income
accounts. See the Appendix for further discussion.
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be interpreted as referring to the deposits and loans of an individual intermediary;
however, in equilibrium, all intermediaries operate on the same scale, so that in our
eventual characterization of equilibrium, we can identify per-intermediary and aggre-
gate or per-capita quantities.) These costs of intermediation are one of the sources
of the financial friction in our model. Like Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), we
simply posit an intermediation technology, rather than seeking to provide a behav-
ioral justification for the spread between the interest rate available to savers and the
one at which it is possible to borrow. This means that we are unable to consider
possible effects of central-bank policy on the efficiency of the banking system.21 We
can, however, consider the consequences for the effects of monetary policy, and for the
optimal conduct of monetary policy, of the existence of, and of exogenous variation
in, obstacles to fully efficient financial intermediation.
Given this technology, a perfectly competitive banking sector will result in an
equilibrium spread ωt between deposit rates and lending rates, such that
1 + ibt = (1 + i
d
t )(1 + ωt), (1.8)
where ωt = Ξ
′
t(bt). We shall allow, however, for additional sources of credit spreads
that are associated with increased resource utilization by intermediaries. Specifically,
we shall assume that the equilibrium spread is given by





where µbt ≥ 1 is a (possibly time-varying) markup in the intermediary sector, assumed
here to vary either for exogenous reasons, or perhaps as a consequence of variation
in the total volume of lending. (Our allowance for an exogenously varying markup
21Certainly we do not deny that at least at certain times, central banks do seek to affect the
efficiency of the banking system; this is true most obviously in the case of actions taken in a
central bank’s capacity as “lender of last resort” during a financial crisis. However, we regard such
actions as representing a largely independent dimension of policy from monetary policy, by which we
mean control of the supply of central-bank balances to the payments system, and of the overnight
interest rate paid for such balances in the interbank market. (Additional lending to intermediaries
through the discount window or similar facilities need not imply any increase in the total supply
of central-bank deposits, as the actions of the Federal Reserve during the most recent crisis have
demonstrated.) Here we are concerned solely with the analysis of the central bank’s monetary
policy decisions, taking as given the evolution of the intermediation frictions (that may reflect other
dimensions of central-bank policy, as well as developments elsewhere in the economy).
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function is analogous to our allowance for a possibly time-varying “wage markup”
in the treatment below of labor supply.) In allowing for a markup in the loan rates
charged by intermediaries — and in particular, in considering a “financial shock”
in which banking markups increase for reasons treated as exogenous — we follow
Gerali et al. (2008).22 However, we need not view the markup µbt as necessarily
reflecting market power on the part of intermediaries; for example, it might stand
in for a time-varying risk premium (though we do not explicitly model any source
of risk23), or for variation in the fraction of loans made to fraudulent borrowers.24
What matters is that the sources of spreads between deposit rates and lending rates
may or may not correspond increased real consumption of resources by the activity of
the intermediaries; and we consider the consequences of variations in the efficiency of
financial intermediation of both types. Using this general notation, market-clearing
in the goods market requires that
Yt =
∫
ct(i)di+Gt + Ξt(bt) (1.10)
each period, and the distributed profits of intermediaries are given by
Dintt+1 = [(1 + i
b
t)bt − (1 + idt )dt]Pt = {[µbt(1 + Ξ′t)− 1]bt − Ξt(bt)}Pt(1 + idt ). (1.11)
This completes our description of the flows of both income and goods among
households, intermediaries, and goods-producing firms. We turn now to the im-
plications of optimal household decisions with regard to consumption, saving, and
22Imperfectly competitive banking is also a feature of the theoretical models of Teranishi (2008)
and Sudo and Teranishi (2008), and the empirical model of Hulsewig et al. (2007).
23In the technology for financial intermediation specified here, there is no risk, since loans and
deposits are assumed to be perfectly matched, both in maturity and in currency denomination, and
the intermediary’s costs are determined by the value of the loans at origination, not by the real
value of required repayment.
24Under the latter interpretation, bt is the real value of loans to legitimate borrowers, who intend
to repay, but χt dollars must be lent for every dollar of legitimate loans, so that total costs of
the banks are χtbt + Ξt(bt). This leads to a marginal cost of lending given by χt + Ξ′t(bt), which
can be written in the same form as the right-hand side of (1.9), under a suitable definition of the
function µbt(bt). If these additional costs (χt−1)bt to the banks are windfall income to the fraudulent
borrowers, and all households share equally in the opportunities for income from fraud, then these
are not real resource costs of banking, and the consequences for household budgets are the same as
if the additional charges were pure profits of the banks (and so distributed equally to households as
part of Dintt+1).
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borrowing. A household for which At(i) > 0 (i.e., a saver) must satisfy a first-order
condition
λt(i) = β(1 + i
d
t )Et[λt+1(i)/Πt+1] (1.12)
in period t, where λt(i) = uc(ct(i); ξt) is the household’s marginal utility of (real)
income in period t, while a household for which At(i) < 0 (a borrower) must instead
satisfy
λt(i) = β(1 + i
b
t)Et[λt+1(i)/Πt+1]. (1.13)
We need not discuss the corresponding first-order condition for a household that
chooses At(i) = 0 exactly (though this is certainly possible, given the kink in house-
holds’ budget sets at this point), as no households are in this situation in the equilibria
that we describe here.
Under conditions specified in the Appendix, one can show that there is an equilib-
rium in which every household of type s has positive savings, while every household
of type b borrows, in every period. Hence the interest rate that is relevant for a given
household’s intertemporal tradeoff turns out to be perfectly correlated with the house-
hold’s type (though this is not due to participation constraints). Moreover, because
in equilibrium, households that access the insurance agency in a given period t have
the same marginal utility of income at the beginning of that period (before learning
their new types), regardless of their past histories, it follows that in any period, all
households of a given type have the same marginal utility of income, regardless of
their histories. Hence we can write λτt for the marginal utility of (real) income of any
household of type τ in period, where τ ∈ {b, s}. Thus the equilibrium evolution of the
marginal utility of income for all households can be described by just two stochastic
processes, {λbt , λst}.














(1− δ)pibλbt+1 + [δ + (1− δ)pis]λst+1
}]
(1.15)
in each period. (These follow from (1.12) – (1.13), taking into account the probability
of switching type from one period to the next.) It follows that all households of a given
type must also choose the same consumption in any period, and, assuming an interior
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which relations can be inverted to yield demand functions
cbt = c
b(λbt ; ξt), c
s
t = c
s(λst ; ξt). (1.16)
Substituting these into (1.10) yields an equilibrium relation
Yt = pibc
b(λbt ; ξt) + pisc
s(λst ; ξt) +Gt + Ξt(bt) (1.17)
linking aggregate demand to the two marginal utilities of income and aggregate bor-
rowing.
The three relations (1.14)–(1.17) generalize the “intertemporal IS relation” of the
basic NK model, which can be expressed by an equation relating aggregate demand
to the marginal utility of income of the representative household (analogous to (1.17))
and a single equation relating that marginal utility of income to the expected real
rate of return implied by the model’s single interest rate. The present model implies
a similar relation between interest rates and the timing of expenditure as in the basic
model. The main differences are (i) that now there are two different interest rates
that each affect aggregate demand (though with the same sign), by affecting the
expenditure decisions of different economic units, and (ii) that the resources used by
the banking sector can also affect aggregate demand.
The presence of two interest rates relevant to aggregate demand determination
does not mean there are two independent dimensions of monetary policy. Instead,
the two rates must be linked by equations (1.8)–(1.9), determining the equilibrium
credit spread.25 If we introduce no further frictions, the policy rate (which is a rate
at which banks are willing to lend short-term funds to one another) corresponds to
the deposit rate idt ;
26 and we may suppose that the central bank directly controls
25Of course, there is an additional, independent dimension of central-bank policy if the central
bank has measures, independent of its control of the policy rate, that can influence the financial
frictions represented by the functions Ξt(bt) or µbt(bt). Since we do not here model the underlying
foundations of these frictions, we cannot comment on the nature of such independent dimensions of
policy using the present model.
26We could introduce a distinction between the rate that banks pay depositors and the rate banks
pay one another for overnight funds, by supposing, as Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) do, that
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this rate.27 In the case that banking uses no real resources (so that Ξt(bt) = 0
regardless of the volume of lending) and the markup µbt is independent of the volume of
lending as well, the system consisting of equations (1.8)–(1.9) and (1.14)–(1.17) gives
a complete account of how real aggregate demand is determined by the expected path
of the policy rate idt relative to expected inflation.
28 This predicted relation between
aggregate demand and the expected path of future interest rates is of essentially the
same kind as in the basic NK model. Hence the introduction of financial frictions, of
a kind capable of accounting for the observed average size and variability of spreads
between deposit rates and lending rates, need not imply any substantial change in
our understanding of the way in which central-bank control of short-term interest
rates determines aggregate expenditure.
Indeed, the basic NK model remains nested as a special case of the model proposed
here. In the case that both types of households have identical preferences (ub(c; ξ) =
us(c; ξ)), and the wedge between the deposit rate and lending rate is always zero
(Ξt(b) = 0, µ
b
t(b) = 1, so that ωt = 0 at all times), our model is equivalent to the
basic NK model. For in this case ibt = i
d
t at all times, so that there is a single
interest rate; equations (1.14)–(1.15) then imply that λbt = λ
s
t at all times;
29 and
since the functions cb(λ; ξ) and cs(λ; ξ) must be identical in this case, equilibrium
must involve cbt = c
s
t at all times. Equation (1.17) then reduces simply to the standard
relation Yt = ct+Gt, while equations (1.14)–(1.15) imply that the common marginal
utility of income of all households satisfies the usual Euler equation. Of course, this
parameterization is not the one we regard as most empirically realistic (in particular,
it would not account for observed spreads, as discussed below); but since the model
has exactly the implications of the basic NK model for some parameter values, it
banks must hold unremunerated reserves in proportion to their deposits, while required reserves are
not increased by borrowing funds in the interbank market. We abstract from reserve requirements
here.
27The issues involved in discussing how the central bank actually controls the policy rate are no
different here than in the case of the standard NK model. See, for example, Woodford (2003, chap.
2).
28To be more precise, the expected path of real interest rates determines only desired current
expenditure relative to expected future expenditure, so that current aggregate demand also depends
on expected long-run output, just as in the basic NK model (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003, chap. 4).
The expected long-run level of output is determined by supply-side factors and by the long-run
inflation target.
29See the Appendix for demonstration of this.
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becomes merely a quantitative issue to determine how different its predictions are for
other parameter values. In fact, our results reported below suggest that for many
questions, a reasonably parameterized version of this model yields predictions quite
similar to those of an appropriately parameterized version of the basic NK model.
1.2 The Dynamics of Private Indebtedness
We allow in general for the possibility that aggregate real borrowing bt from financial
intermediaries may affect aggregate demand, by affecting the real resources used by
the banking sector (the term Ξt(bt) in (1.17)), by affecting the equilibrium spread
between the deposit rate and the lending rate (equation (1.9)), or both. Hence in
general a complete model of how interest-rate policy affects aggregate demand requires
that we model the evolution of aggregate bank credit, or alternatively, of aggregate
household indebtedness.
Integrating (1.1) over all those borrowers in period t who did not have access to the
insurance agency in the current period, one finds aggregate net beginning-of-period
assets for these households of
−δPt−1bt−1(1 + ibt−1) + δpibDintt .
Adding to this quantity the beginning-of-period assets (At per household) of those
households who did receive insurance transfers at the beginning period t and then
learned that they are of type b, one obtains∫
Bt
At(i)di = (1− δ)pibAt − δPt−1bt−1(1 + ibt−1) + δpibDintt (1.18)
for the aggregate beginning-of-period net assets of borrowers in period t. Moreover,






t − wbt −Dt − T gt ],
where wτt denotes the real wage income of each household of type τ .
30 Finally, using
(1.18) to substitute for aggregate beginning-of-period assets, and then using (1.4)
30The fact that each household of a given type has the same labor supply and same wage income
follows from the fact that in equilibrium each has the same marginal utility of income; see the further
discussion of labor supply below.
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to substitute for At, using (1.5) to substitute for T
g
t , using (1.6) to substitute for
Dt, using (1.7) to substitute for dt, using (1.8) to substitute for i
b
t , using (1.11) to
substitute for Dintt , and using (1.17) to substitute for Yt, one obtains





t−1)/Πt − bgt ] + pibpis[(cbt − cst)− (wbt − wst )], (1.19)
using the notation ωt(bt) for the function defined in (1.9).
The dynamics of private indebtedness thus depend, among other things, on the
distribution of wage income across households of the two types. We assume labor
supply behavior of exactly the same kind for both types of households (as a conse-
quence of their identical disutility of working), except for the fact that the marginal
utilities of income for the two types of households differ. Any household i, if acting
as a wage-taker in the market for labor of type j, will supply hours ht(j; i) to the
point at which
vh(ht(j; i); ξt) = λt(i)Wt(j)/Pt. (1.20)
Aggregation of the labor supply behavior of the two types is facilitated if, as in
Benigno and Woodford (2005), we assume the isoelastic functional form




where {H¯t} is an exogenous labor-supply disturbance process. Solving (1.20) for the
competitive labor supply of each type and aggregating, we obtain
ht(j) = H¯t[λ˜tWt(j)/Pt]
1/ν

















for the real wage required if firms are to be able to hire a quantity ht(j) of labor
of type j. More generally (and also as in Benigno and Woodford), we allow for the
possibility of imperfect competition in the labor market, and suppose that the real








where µwt ≥ 1 is an exogenous, possibly time-varying markup factor, indicating vari-
ations in the market power of labor.
The above theory of labor supply implies that households of type τ supply frac-
tion (λτt /λ˜t)
1/ν of all labor of each type j, and hence receive that same fraction of
aggregate labor income. However, in order to solve for the dynamics of private indebt-
edness, we must also determine the distribution of national income between labor and
capital (since profits are distributed equally to all households, unlike wage income).




for each differentiated good i, where φ ≥ 1 and At is an exogenous, possibly time-
varying productivity factor, common to all goods. Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (on the
part of government as well as households31) imply that the demand for each differen-







where Yt is demand for the composite good, pt(i) is the price of good i, Pt is the price
of the composite good, and θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across differentiated
goods.
Using these relations to solve for the labor demand ht(i) of each firm i as a function
of its price, integrating over the firms in each industry j to find the total demand for
labor of type j,32 solving for the implied real wage for labor of type j, and finally











31Dixit-Stiglitz preferences imply that household utility depends only on the quantity purchased
of a certain composite good, a CES aggregate of the purchases of the individual goods. We assume
that government purchases quantity Gt of this same composite good, and that the composition of
government purchases minimize the cost of obtaining that quantity of the composite good. We
similarly assume that the resources Ξt used in intermediation are in units of the composite good,
and that intermediaries obtain these resources at minimum cost.
32Note that we assume, as in Woodford (2003, chap. 3), that all firms in a given industry re-
evaluate their prices at the same time, so that the price pt(i) is at each time the same for all firms
i in industry j.
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is a measure of the dispersion of goods prices (taking its minimum possible value, 1,
if and only if all prices are identical). In the Calvo model of price adjustment, this
dispersion measure evolves according to a law of motion
∆t = h(∆t−1,Πt), (1.25)
where the function h(∆,Π) is defined in the Appendix.
Using (1.24) for the total wage bill and our conclusion regarding the distribution
of the wage bill between households of the two types, we can solve for the wage
income of households of each type. This solution, together with the consumption
functions (1.16), allows us to write the last term in square brackets in (1.19) as a




t ,∆t; ξ˜t), defined in the Appendix, where the vector
ξ˜t of exogenous disturbances includes both the vector of preference shocks ξt and
the additional exogenous disturbances At and µ
w
t . The law of motion for private
indebtedness bt can then be written





t−1)/Πt − bgt ] + pibpisB(Yt, λbt , λst ,∆t; ξ˜t). (1.26)
This allows us to describe the evolution of real private debt as a function of its
own past level, disturbances to the financial sector (possible exogenous shifts in the
functions Ξt(b) and ωt(b)), the evolution of the policy rate i
d
t relative to inflation,





t ,∆t; ξ˜t) that determine the relative expenditure and the relative incomes
of the two types of households.
The system of equations consisting of (1.8)–(1.9), (1.14)–(1.17), and (1.25)–(1.26),
together with a monetary-policy reaction function (such as a Taylor rule) to specify idt
(as a function of variables such as inflation and real activity) and a fiscal rule to specify
the real public debt bgt (also possibly as a function of variables such as inflation and
real activity), then comprise a complete “aggregate demand block” for our model, that
suffices to determine the evolution of the variables {λbt , λst , ibt , idt ,Πt,∆t, bt} given the
evolution of {Yt} and the exogenous disturbances. It remains to specify the model’s
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“aggregate supply block,” that determines aggregate output Yt for any given evolution
of inflation and other variables, in order to have a complete general-equilibrium model
of the monetary transmission mechanism.
A noteworthy property of this system is that when credit frictions matter, Ricar-
dian equivalence generally does not obtain. Even if we consider alternative paths for
{bgt} while holding the path of distorting taxes {τ t} constant, so that contemplated
changes in the path of government debt are achieved entirely through changes in the
size of lump-sum transfers, a change in the path of the public debt will generally
require a different equilibrium evolution of real activity, interest rates and inflation,
contrary to the implication of the basic NK model.33 For (1.26) implies that in the
absence of any offsetting changes in the paths of other endogenous variables, a change
in the path of {bgt} will require an offsetting change in the path of {bt}; essentially,
government borrowing crowds out private borrowing, in the absence of changes in
macroeconomic conditions that increase aggregate private saving.34 In the special
case considered at the end of the previous section (when Ξt = 0 and ωt is indepen-
dent of the level of private debt), this change in the path of private indebtedness
still has no consequences for the determination of aggregate output, interest rates or
inflation, or for the allocation of consumption or labor effort between the two types
of households, and so Ricardian equivalence still obtains. However, except in this
special case, a change in the path of private indebtedness has consequences for ag-
gregate demand determination, by changing the spread between the lending rate and
the deposit rate, by changing the resources used by intermediaries, or both.
33Crucial to this result is our assumption here that the government can borrow from the private
sector at a rate more favorable than that available to private non-financial borrowers: the rate idt
at which intermediaries are able to obtain funding, rather than the rate ibt paid by households that
must borrow from intermediaries. In effect, when the public debt is increased the government is
(among other things) borrowing at this lower rate on behalf of households that would like to borrow
at this rate but are assumed to be unable to do so on their own account. This increases aggregate
demand in somewhat the same way as a reduction in credit spreads does.
34In the simple case in which ωt(bt) = Ξt(bt) = 0, (1.26) determines the evolution of an aggregate
credit variable, bt + pibb
g
t , in a way that is independent of the composition of that variable, so
that a unit increase in bgt requires a reduction of bt by precisely pib units, so that each borrowing
household must borrow exactly one unit less for each unit that is borrowed (per capita) by the
government. The relation between the evolution of the two variables is more complex when private
indebtedness increases credit frictions while government debt does not, but the most important
effect of government borrowing remains the “crowding out” of private borrowing.
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1.3 Aggregate Supply
It remains to specify the aggregate supply side of the model. This part of the model
remains the same as the basic NK model (as expounded, for example, in Benigno
and Woodford, 2005), except that in modelling the cost of supplying a given quantity
of output (and hence the incentives of price-setters) we must take account of the
differing labor supply behavior of savers and borrowers. The model of labor supply
explained above implies that the equilibrium real marginal cost of supplying output












This differs from the expression in Benigno and Woodford only in that the factor λ˜t
in the denominator is no longer the marginal utility of income of a representative
household, and so is no longer so simply related to aggregate real expenditure.
As in the basic NK model, we assume staggered price adjustment of the kind first
hypothesized by Calvo (1983). This implies an inflation equation of the form
Πt = Π(Zt), (1.27)
where Zt is a vector of two forward-looking variables, recursively defined by a pair of
relations of the form




t ; ξ˜t) + Et[g(Πt+1, Zt+1)], (1.28)
where the vector-valued functions G and g are defined in the Appendix. (Among the
arguments of G, the vector of exogenous disturbances ξ˜t now includes the sales tax
rate τ t, in addition to the disturbances already mentioned; this is relevant to firms’
pricing decisions, as they balance after-tax marginal revenue with the marginal cost
of supplying more
These relations are of exactly the same form as in the basic NK model, except
that two distinct marginal utilities of income are here arguments of G; in the case
that λbt = λ
s
t = λt, the relations (1.28) reduce to exactly the ones in Benigno and
Woodford (2005). The system (1.27)–(1.28) indicates the nature of the short-run
aggregate-supply trade-off between inflation and real activity at a point in time, given
expectations regarding the future evolution of inflation and of the variables {Zt}.
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(The precise nature of the implied aggregate-supply relation is discussed further in
section 2.1.) Equations (1.8)–(1.9), (1.14)–(1.17), (1.25)–(1.26), and (1.27)–(1.28),
together with equations specifying interest-rate policy and the evolution of the public
debt, then comprise a complete system of equations for determination of the endoge-
nous variables {Yt, λbt , λst , ibt , idt , Zt,Πt,∆t, bt}, given the evolution of the exogenous
disturbances.
2 Credit Frictions and the Propagation of Distur-
bances
We have shown that it is possible to generalize the basic NK model in a fairly straight-
forward way to incorporate credit frictions — more specifically, a spread between the
deposit rate and the lending rate, that may be large or small, constant or variable,
and exogenous or endogenous, depending how we choose to parameterize the model.
This shows, at the very least, that the inherent structure of NK models does not in
some way require one to ignore the existence of such frictions. But how much does
this generalization change the implications of the resulting model?
In this section, we consider the effects on the economy of a variety of types of ex-
ogenous disturbances, including monetary policy shocks, under simple specifications
of monetary policy. Our goal is not yet to compare monetary policies, but rather to
compare the predictions of alternative model specifications; we wish to determine to
what extent our conclusions about the consequences of a given monetary policy are
affected by the introduction of heterogeneity and credit frictions.
2.1 Log-Linearized Structural Relations
To approach this question, we log-linearize the structural relations of our model
around steady-state values of the various endogenous variables that represent a per-
fect foresight equilibrium in the case of no random variation in any of the exogenous
disturbance processes, as discussed further in the Appendix. The solution to these
linear equations under a correspondingly log-linear specification of monetary policy
provides a linear approximation to the equilibrium responses to the various types
of disturbances, in the case that these random variations are small enough. The
linearity of the solution allows us to discuss the equilibrium responses to individual
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shocks independently of whether other exogenous variables change concurrently, and
to discuss the size of the responses relative to the size of the shock without caring
about the size of the shock that is considered.
We first summarize the structure of the log-linearized model, as these equations
themselves provide considerable insight into the model’s implications, and the simi-
larities and differences between the predictions of the generalized model and those of
the basic NK model (which is itself most familiar in its log-linearized form). We log-
linearize the structural relations of the previous section around a steady state with
zero inflation (Π¯ = 1). This means that in our analysis, we shall restrict attention to
monetary policy rules that imply an inflation rate of zero, or one not far from zero, in
the absence of stochastic disturbances. This simplification is familiar in the standard
NK literature, and we follow it here in order to focus solely on the new complications
introduced by heterogeneity and credit frictions. Moreover, we show in section 3 that
according to the present model, optimal monetary policy has this property; hence the
approximation adopted here suffices for the study of monetary policies that are close
enough to optimal policy.






t − Etpit+1 + (δ + (1− δ)pib)Etλˆ
b







t − Etpit+1 + (δ + (1− δ)pis)Etλˆ
s
t+1 + (1− δ)pibEtλˆ
b
t+1, (2.2)
introducing the notation λˆ
τ
t ≡ log(λτt /λ¯τ ) for τ = b, s; ıˆmt ≡ log(1 + imt /1 + ı¯m) for
m = b, d; and pit ≡ log Πt for the rate of inflation. (In each case, a variable with a
bar indicates the steady-state value of the corresponding variable, discussed in the
Appendix.) Log-linearization of (1.8) similarly yields
ıˆbt = ıˆ
d
t + ωˆt, (2.3)
where ωˆt ≡ log(1 + ωt/1 + ω¯). We can similarly log-linearize (1.9) to obtain ωˆt as a
linear function of bˆt, where we define bˆt ≡ log(bt/b¯).
This system can be alternatively expressed in a way that makes the model’s im-
plications more transparent. If we take a weighted average of equations (2.1) and
(2.2), weighting the two equations by pib and pis respectively, we obtain
λˆt = ıˆ
avg
t − Etpit+1 + Etλˆt+1, (2.4)
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where we now define λˆt ≡ pibλˆbt + pisλˆ
s
t as the average (log) marginal utility of income
and
ıˆavgt ≡ pibıˆbt + pisıˆdt (2.5)
as the average of the interest rates that are relevant (at the margin) for all of the
savers and borrowers in the economy. Subtracting (2.2) from (2.1) instead yields
Ωˆt = ωˆt + δEtΩˆt+1, (2.6)
where Ωˆt ≡ λˆbt− λˆ
s
t is a measure of the inefficiency of financial intermediation, insofar
as the marginal utilities of the two (ex ante identical) types would be equated if
financial markets were frictionless. Equations (2.4) and (2.6) are equivalent to the
system (2.1)–(2.2), but highlight the fact that the (appropriately defined) average
marginal utility of income is still related to the expected path of real interest rates
— once an appropriate average interest rate is defined — in exactly the same way
as in the basic NK model, while the dispersion of marginal utilities of income across
differently situated members of the population depends only the evolution of the
credit spread {ωt} (which is in turn a function of exogenous conditions affecting the
banking sector, and of the total volume of lending) and not the absolute level of real
or nominal interest rates.
Log-linearization of (1.17) yields
Yˆt = scc¯t − σ¯(λˆt + sΩΩˆt) + Gˆt + Ξˆt, (2.7)
where we define Yˆt ≡ log(Yt/Y¯ ), Gˆt ≡ (Gt − G¯)/Y¯ , and Ξˆt ≡ (Ξt − Ξ¯)/Y¯ ,35 and
the exogenous disturbance c¯t is a weighted average of changes in the impatience to
consume of the two types of households. The coefficient σ¯ measures the (appropriately
weighted) average36 sensitivity of households’ expenditure decisions to variations in
35We do not define these last two hat variables as log deviations from the steady-state value, so
that we can discuss calibrations in which G¯ or Ξ¯ may equal zero, though we still consider small
non-zero values of the corresponding disturbances.
36Definition (2.8) implies that σ¯ is only actually an average of σb and σs in the case that G¯ = Ξ¯ = 0.
More generally, σ¯ is sc times the average household intertemporal elasticity of substitution, where
sc ≡ pibsb+ pisss is the share of private expenditure in aggregate expenditure. In terms of the nota-
tion used in Woodford (2003, pp. 80, 243), σ¯ is the coefficient analogous to σ in the representative-
household model, while the coefficients στ are analogous to the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion σC .
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the marginal utility of income (or equivalently, their interest-sensitivity);
σ¯ ≡ pibsbσb + pisssσs > 0, (2.8)
where στ is each type’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution and sτ ≡ c¯τ/Y¯ is the
steady-state share of each type’s purchases in aggregate national expenditure. The
coefficient
sΩ ≡ pibpis sbσb − ssσs
σ¯
(2.9)
indicates the degree to which aggregate demand is affected by heterogeneity in the
marginal utility of income, given the average marginal utility of income; this depends
on the degree to which the expenditure decisions of borrowers are more interest-
elastic than those of savers. (More precisely, what matters is how much the aggregate
reduction in borrowing by borrowers, per percentage point increase in the interest rate
that they face, exceeds the aggregate increase in saving by savers in response to an
interest-rate increase of the same size.)
Solving (2.7) for λˆt as a function of aggregate expenditure, and substituting for
λˆt in (2.4), we obtain an “intertemporal IS relation”
Yˆt = −σ¯(ˆıavgt − Etpit+1) + EtYˆt+1 − Et[∆gt+1 +∆Ξˆt+1 − σ¯sΩ∆Ωˆt+1], (2.10)
where gt ≡ Gˆt + scc¯t is a composite disturbance as in Woodford (2003, pp. 80, 249),
and ∆ indicates a first difference. Note that the first four terms on the right-hand side
of (2.10) are exactly as in the basic NK model (with appropriate generalizations of
the definitions of variables and coefficients to allow for heterogeneity), while the final
two terms exist only in the case of credit frictions. An important difference between
this relation and the standard “IS relation” is that the interest rate appearing in it
is no longer the policy rate. Instead, (2.3) together with (2.5) imply that the policy




t + pibωˆt, (2.11)
indicating that the spread between them increases when credit spreads increase.
The complete aggregate demand block developed in section 1.1 can then be sum-
marized (in our log-linear approximation) by the intertemporal IS relation (2.10),
together with (2.11) connecting the average interest rate with the policy rate, the
log-linear version of (1.9) for the determination of the credit spread, and (2.6) for
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the determination of the marginal-utility gap Ωˆt. In the case that either ωˆt or Ξˆt de-
pends (to first order) on the evolution of bˆt, completion of the system of equilibrium
relations requires a law of motion for aggregate private indebtedness. Log-linearizing




t , we obtain an
equation for bˆt as a linear function of bˆt−1, ıˆdt−1− pit, Yˆt, Ωˆt, bˆgt , bˆgt−1, and the exogenous
disturbances. (See the Appendix for details.)
Log-linearization of the aggregate-supply block consisting of equations (1.27)–
(1.28) yields the log-linear aggregate-supply relation
pit = ξ[ωyYˆt − ˆ˜λt − νh¯t − (1 + ωy)at + µˆwt + τˆ t] + βEtpit+1, (2.12)
through calculations explained in the Appendix, where we define ˆ˜λt ≡ log(λ˜t/¯˜λ),
h¯t ≡ log(H¯t/H¯), at ≡ log(At/A¯), µˆwt ≡ log(µwt /µ¯w), τˆ t ≡ − log(1− τ t/1− τ¯), and





(where 0 < α < 1 is the fraction of prices that remain unchanged from one period
to the next) determines the sensitivity of the inflation rate to variation in average
marginal costs. Note that (2.12) takes exactly the same form as in the basic NK
model, except that here ˆ˜λt replaces the marginal utility of income of the representative
household.
It is also important to note that the “average” marginal utility of income ˆ˜λt that
enters the aggregate-supply relation is in general not exactly the same as the one that
enters the aggregate-demand relation (2.7), or the one that is most directly related
to the expected path of real interest rates in (2.4). The two are related through the
identity









Using this to substitute for ˆ˜λt in (2.12), and then using (2.7) to substitute for λˆt as
in the derivation of (2.10), we obtain an aggregate-supply relation
pit = κ(Yˆt − Yˆ nt ) + ut + ξ(sΩ + pib − γb)Ωˆt − ξσ¯−1Ξˆt + βEtpit+1, (2.13)
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with a slope
κ ≡ ξ(ωy + σ¯−1) > 0.
Here the composite exogenous disturbance term Yˆ nt (the “natural rate of output”)
is a linear combination of the disturbances c¯t, Gˆt, h¯t, and at (sources of variation in
the flexible-price equilibrium level of output that, in the absence of steady-state dis-
tortions or financial frictions, correspond to variations in the efficient level of output,
as discussed further in section 3); the additional exogenous term ut (the “cost-push
shock”) is instead a linear combination of the disturbances µˆwt and τˆ t (sources of
variation in the flexible-price equilibrium level of output that do not correspond to
any change in the efficient level of output). This is identical to the “new Keynesian
Phillips curve” of the basic NK model, with the exception of the terms proportional
to Ωˆt and Ξˆt, indicating “cost-push” effects of the credit frictions in our extended
model.
Equations (2.10) and (2.13) are thus direct analogs of two of the equations of
the canonical “three-equation model”; the third equation (a central-bank reaction
function, such as a Taylor rule, for the policy rate as a function of inflation and
output) is unchanged by the existence of credit frictions. In the case that both {ωˆt}
and {Ξˆt} can be treated as exogenous processes (so that {Ωˆt} is exogenous as well),
these same three equations again provide a complete system for the determination of
equilibrium inflation, output and interest rates, except that one must adjoin equation
(2.11) to connect the interest rate that appears in the IS relation to the policy rate.
If one substitutes the central-bank reaction function for ıˆdt in (2.11), in order to derive
the implied response of the average interest rate — or if one supposes that the central
bank uses the average interest rate as its operating target, a policy proposal that we
analyze further in section 3 — then one again obtains a three-equation model directly
analogous to the basic NK model. For example, if the central bank follows a Taylor
rule of the form
ıˆdt = φpipit + φyYˆt + ²
m
t , (2.14)
then the complete model would consist of (2.10), (2.13), and
ıˆavgt = φpipit + φyYˆt + pibωˆt + ²
m
t . (2.15)
The only differences relative to the basic NK model are that the interest rate appear-
ing in this three-equation system is not the only relevant interest rate and may not
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correspond to the policy rate; that the numerical values of the coefficients σ¯ and κ
must take appropriate account of the different degrees of interest-sensitivity of ex-
penditure of different units in the economy; and that time-varying financial frictions
are an additional source of disturbance terms in all three equations.
It follows that at least in this case, inflation and output determination can be
understood in exactly the same way as in the basic NK model, regardless of the
average size of credit frictions, or their degree of variability. For example, in the case
that the monetary policy equation involves no response to lagged variables (or to
any endogenous variables other than inflation, output, or forecasts of these), and the
policy implies a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium, that equilibrium will
make inflation, output and interest rates all a function solely of the economy’s current
state — to be precise, the current values of Yˆ nt , gt, ut, ωˆt, Ξˆt, and the monetary policy
disturbance, and current information about the expected future evolution of these
variables. (As has often been remarked of the basic NK model, the model is thus
“purely forward-looking,” and cannot explain inflation persistence other than as a
consequence of persistence in the exogenous disturbances just mentioned.)
In the simple case of a monetary policy described by (2.14), the conditions for
determinacy of equilibrium remain exactly the same as in the basic NK model; in the
case that φpi, φy ≥ 0, these amount simply to the requirement that the policy rule






If this condition is satisfied, one can solve for inflation as a function of current and
expected future values of the disturbance processes in exactly the same way as is
explained in Woodford (2003, chap. 4, secs. 2.2, 2.4), and the coefficients on current
and expected future values of the disturbances c¯t, Gˆt, h¯t, at, µˆ
w
t , τˆ
t, or ²mt at all horizons
are identical to the predictions of the basic NK model, if the latter model is calibrated
to have the same values for the coefficients β, ξ, σ¯, and ωy.
37 The only difference in
37Of course, the numerical values of some of these coefficients may be different, owing to the
existence of credit frictions, than they would be in an economy without such frictions, owing, for
example, to an effect of steady-state distortions resulting from credit spreads on the steady-state
level of output, and hence the point at which various elasticities are evaluated. This would not,
however, affect the accuracy of predictions made by the NK model if it were correctly parameterized
to match the elasticities observed in an actual economy.
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the solution is that shocks to the current or expected future values of the financial
disturbances ωˆt and Ξˆt will affect equilibrium inflation as well.
Moreover, not only does the model predict the same numerical responses to non-
financial disturbances, under given monetary-policy coefficients (φpi, φy) — so that
one’s conclusions about the desirability of a particular choice of those coefficients,
from the point of view of how they effect the economy’s response to non-financial dis-
turbances, will be unchanged — but the predicted responses to financial disturbances
do not really involve any new considerations (beyond the mere fact that such distur-
bances can occur and ought to be measured in order to properly conduct policy). The
effects of variations in the processes {ωˆt, Ξˆt} on inflation and output are predicted to
be the same as the effects that other kinds of disturbances have, when they shift the
three equations to a similar extent and with a similar expected degree of persistence.
Thus the effects of financial shocks on inflation can be decomposed into three types of
effects that are already present in the basic NK model: the effects of a disturbance to
the “natural rate of interest” (a shift in the real average interest rate consistent with
a zero output gap), the effects of a “cost-push shock” (a shift in the size of output gap
required for price stability), and the effects of a “monetary policy shock” (a change
in the average interest rate relative to what would ordinarily follow from the current
inflation rate and output gap, in this case due to a change in the credit spread rather
than a change in the policy rate). Financial disturbances typically have effects of all
three types; but their consequences can be easily understood if the consequences of
those three general types of disturbances are already understood.
The case in which {ωˆt, Ξˆt} are both completely exogenous processes is, of course,
a fairly special one. If one or both of them depends on the volume of bank lending,
as allowed for in our exposition above, a larger system of equations, including the law
of motion for private debt, is needed in order to predict the evolution of inflation,
output and interest rates. We do not seek to present analytical results for this more
complex case, but instead offer some illustrative numerical results.
2.2 Model Calibration
The numerical values for parameters that are used in our calculations are explained in
the Appendix. Many of the model’s parameters are also parameters of the basic NK
model, and in the case of these parameters we assume similar numerical values as in
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the numerical analysis of the basic NK model in Woodford (2003). The new parame-
ters that are also needed for the present model are those relating to heterogeneity or
to the specification of the credit frictions. The parameters relating to heterogeneity
are the fraction pib of households that are borrowers, the degree of persistence δ of a
household’s “type”, the steady-state expenditure level of borrowers relative to savers,
sb/ss, and the interest-elasticity of expenditure of borrowers relative to that of savers,
σb/σs.
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In the calculations reported here, we assume that pib = pis = 0.5, so that there
are an equal number of borrowers and savers. We assume that δ = 0.975, so that the
expected time until a household has access to the insurance agency (and its type is
drawn again) is 10 years. This means that the expected path of the spread between
lending and deposit rates for 10 years or so into the future affects current spending
decisions, but that expectations regarding the spread several decades in the future
are nearly irrelevant.
We calibrate the values of sb and ss to equal 1.1 and 0.3 respectively, so that the
steady-state share of private expenditure in output is 0.7 (the mean of those two val-
ues).39 This degree of heterogeneity is chosen arbitrarily for purposes of illustration;
it is important, however, that sb > ss, as this is required in order for the steady state
to involve borrowing by the type b households. The degree of heterogeneity assumed
in our calibrated examples implies steady-state debt b¯ between 0.5 and 0.6 of steady-
state output (with the exact fraction depending on the intermediation technology).
Finally, we calibrate the value of σb/σs to equal 5. This is again an arbitrary
choice, though the fact that borrowers are assumed to have a greater willingness
to substitute intertemporally is important, as this results in the prediction that an
exogenous tightening of monetary policy (a positive value of the residual ²mt in (2.14))
results in a reduction in the equilibrium volume of credit bt (see Figures 2 and 5 below).
38Another new parameter as a consequence of heterogeneity is the steady-state level of government
debt relative to GDP, b¯g/Y¯ . This parameter need not be specified in the representative-household
basic NK model, since changes in it simply imply a different steady-state level of net transfers, and
the size of these does not affect any of the equilibrium relations. In the model with heterogeneity,
it does matter, because of the failure of Ricardian equivalence noted above. But in our baseline
calculations, we assume that b¯g = 0.
39The implied share of government purchases in total output is then 0.3, minus the small part of
output that is consumed by intermediaries. The implied steady-state level of government purchases
therefore varies slightly, depending on our calibration of the intermediation technology.
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In fact, the degree of asymmetry assumed here results in a predicted contraction of
credit in response to a monetary policy shock of roughly the magnitude indicated
by VAR estimates using recent US data in the case of an exogenous credit spread
(Figure 2),40 though the predicted credit contraction is smaller (while still positive)
when we assume that credit spreads increase with the volume of credit. (In the results
reported here, we hold constant our parameterization of preferences when we change
the assumed intermediation technology, in order to clarify how the intermediation
technology affects the results obtained.41)
It is also necessary to specify the steady-state values of the functions ω(b) and Ξ(b)
that describe the financial frictions, in addition to making clear what kinds of random
perturbations of these functions we wish to consider when analyzing the effects of
“financial shocks.” We here mainly present results for two cases. In each case, we
assume that there is no steady-state financial markup (µ¯b = 1), so that the steady-
state credit spread is due entirely to the marginal resource cost of intermediation;
but we do allow for exogenous shocks to the markup µbt (which then becomes slightly
greater than 1), and this is what we mean by the “financial shock” in Figures 16 and
17 below.42 In treating the “financial shock” as involving an increase in markups but
no increase in the real resources used in banking, we follow Gerali et al. (2008).43
The two cases considered differ in the specification of the (time-invariant) interme-
diation technology Ξ(b). In the case of a linear intermediation technology, we suppose
that Ξ(b) = ω¯b, while in the case of a convex intermediation technology, we assume
40As discussed in the Appendix, our estimated elasticities range from values in the range from -0.2
to -0.4 for samples using only data since the 1990s, though we obtain larger responses, on the order
of -0.9, using samples including data from the 1980s. See also Lown and Morgan (2002) for evidence
similarly supporting the association of credit contraction with a monetary policy tightening.
41To be precise, we hold constant across specifications of the financial frictions the numerical
values assumed for the total share of private expenditure in aggregate output, as well as for the
relative shares sb/ss of the two types; and for the aggregate elasticity of intertemporal substitution
σ¯, as well as for the relative elasticities σb/σs of the two types. This does not quite mean that the
utility functions ub(c; ξ) and us(c; ξ) are invariant; see the Appendix for details.
42Note that our conclusions regarding both equilibrium and optimal responses to shocks other
than the “financial shock” are the same as in an economy in which the banking system is perfectly
competitive (and there are no risk premia), up to the linear approximation used in the numerical
results reported below.
43These authors cite the Eurosystem’s quarterly Bank Lending Survey as showing that since
October 2007, banks in the euro area had “strongly increased the margins charged on average and
riskier loans” (p. 24).
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that
Ξ(b) = Ξ˜bη (2.16)
for some η > 1.44 In both cases, in our numerical analyses we assume a steady-state
credit spread ω¯ equal to 2.0 percentage points per annum,45 corresponding to the
median spread between the FRB index of commercial and industrial loan rates and
the federal funds rate, over the period 1986-2007. (Combined with our assumption
that “types” persist for 10 years on average, this implies a steady-state “marginal
utility gap” Ω¯ ≡ λ¯b/λ¯s = 1.22, so that there would be a non-trivial welfare gain from
transferring further resources from savers to borrowers.) In the case of the convex
technology, we set η so that a one-percent increase in the volume of credit increases
the credit spread by 10 basis points (per annum).46 The assumption that η > 1 allows
our model to match the prediction of VAR estimates that an unexpected tightening
of monetary policy is associated with a slight reduction in credit spreads (see, e.g.,
Lown and Morgan, 2002); and the elasticity assumed in our calibration is roughly of
the magnitude implied by the relative size of our estimates of the respective declines
in the volume of credit and of the average credit spread.47
As a first exercise, we consider the implied equilibrium responses of the model’s
endogenous variables to the various kinds of exogenous disturbances, under the as-
sumption that monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule of the form (2.14). The
coefficients of the monetary policy rule are assigned the values φpi = 2 and φy = 0.25
as in Woodford (2003, chap. 4), allowing comparison between our quantitative re-
sults here and those presented there for a calibrated representative-household model.
Among other disturbances, we consider the effects of random disturbances to the er-
ror term ²mt in the monetary policy rule. Later, we consider the predicted dynamics
44One interpretation of this function is in terms of a monitoring technology of the kind assumed
in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). Suppose that a bank produces monitoring according to a




t , where k is a fixed factor (“bank capital”), and
must produce a unit of monitoring for each unit of loans that it manages. Then the produced
goods Ξt required as inputs to the monitoring technology in order to manage a quantity b of loans
will be given by a function of the form (2.16), where Ξ˜ = k1−η. A sudden impairment of bank
capital, treated as an exogenous disturbance, can then be represented as a random increase in the
multiplicative factor Ξ˜. This is another form of “financial shock”, with similar, though not identical,
effects as the financial markup shock considered here; see the Appendix for further discussion.
45In our quarterly numerical model, this means that we choose a value such that (1+ ω¯)4 = 1.02.
46This requires that η = 6.06.
47See the Appendix for further details.
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under a variety of other monetary policy specifications as well.
2.3 Numerical Results
We begin by considering the predicted responses to aggregate disturbances of a kind
that also exist in the basic NK model, in order to determine how accurate that
model’s answers are about the questions to which it gives answers. We first consider
the case of a linear intermediation technology. In this case, the credit spread ωt
evolves exogenously, as assumed in the discussion at the end of section 1.1, but Ξt is
no longer independent of bt. Nonetheless, in this case we continue to find that for a
reasonable parameterization of the quantity of resources used in intermediation, the
existence of credit frictions makes virtually no difference for the predicted equilibrium
responses to shocks.
This is illustrated in Figures 2-4 for three particular types of exogenous distur-
bances. In Figure 2 we consider the equilibrium responses to a contractionary mone-
tary policy shock, represented by a unit (one percentage point, annualized) increase
in ²mt . We furthermore assume that the policy disturbance is persistent; specifically,
²mt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with coefficient of autocorrelation ρ = 0.75.
The separate panels of the figure indicate the impulse responses of output, inflation,48
the deposit rate, the lending rate,footnoteIn the present model, the spread between
the deposit rate and the lending rate is exogenously fixed, and so these two variables
necessarily respond by exactly the same amount, except in the case of a shock to the
exogenous credit spread itself. However, we include both panels as we use the same
format for the figures to follow, when inclusion of both is no longer redundant. and
aggregate private debt respectively. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium responses
of the same variables to a unit positive innovation in the productivity factor, where
the disturbance is again assumed to have an autocorrelation of 0.75, and monetary
policy is conducted in accordance with (2.14) with no random term. Figure 4 shows
the corresponding equilibrium responses in response to an increase in government
purchases by an amount equal to one percent of total output.
In each figure, the predicted impulse responses under our model with financial
48In the plots, both the inflation rate and the interest rates are reported as annualized rates, so
that 0.10 means an increase in the inflation rate of 10 basis points per annum. In terms of our
quarterly model, what is plotted is not the response of pit, but rather the response of 4pit.
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frictions (the case labeled ‘FF’ in each figure) are contrasted with those under two
variant parameterizations of the model. The case labeled ‘NoFF’ corresponds to
an otherwise identical model in which ωt(b) ≡ 0 and Ξt(b) ≡ 0, but we retain the
heterogeneity in preferences, parameterized in the same way as in the ‘FF’ model.
The case labeled ‘RepHH’ is one in which in addition to assuming zero credit fric-
tions, we assume identical preferences for the two types; this model is equivalent to
a representative-household model (specifically, to the basic NK model as presented
in Woodford, 2003, chap. 4). Comparison of these three cases allows us to sepa-
rately consider the degree to which credit frictions as opposed to heterogeneity make
a difference.
In each of Figures 2 through 4, we observe that the impulse responses of output,
inflation, and the two interest rates are virtually identical under all three parameteri-
zations of the model. (The same is true for the other aggregate disturbances that have
analogs in the representative-household model — a common disturbance to the im-
patience to consume of all households, a disturbance to the disutility of work, a shock
to government purchases, a shock to the tax rate, or a shock to the wage markup —
though we do not include these figures here.) We have already explained in section
2.1 why this would be true in the case that the resources used in intermediation are
independent of the volume of lending. Our numerical results indicate that even when
we assume that intermediation uses resources (and indeed that credit spreads are
entirely due to the marginal resource cost of making additional loans), and that the
required resources are proportional to the volume of lending, heterogeneity and the
existence of a steady-state credit spread (of a realistic magnitude) still make only a
negligible difference. This is because the contribution of the banking sector to the
overall variation in the aggregate demand for produced goods and services is still
quite small.49
Financial frictions matter somewhat more for equilibrium dynamics if we also as-
sume that credit spreads vary endogenously with the volume of lending. Figures 5-10
show equilibrium responses of the same aggregate variables to a variety of types of
exogenous disturbances, in the case of the “convex intermediation technology” cali-
49Note that in each of Figures 2-4, the existence of the credit frictions in the ‘FF’ model makes
a substantial difference for the equilibrium evolution of credit bt relative to the prediction of the
‘NoFF’ model. However, this change in the size of the banking sector does not have substantial
consequences for aggregate output, employment, or inflationary pressure.
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bration discussed in section 2.2. Figures 5, 6 and 8 show responses to the same three
kinds of shocks as in Figures 2-4 respectively, but for the alternative intermediation
technology. Figure 7 shows responses to an exogenous 1 percent increase in the wage
markup µwt ; Figure 9 shows responses to an exogenous increase in the impatience
to consume of savers; and Figure 10 shows responses to an exogenous increase in
real government debt by an amount equal to 1 percent of GDP. In each case, the
disturbance is modeled as an AR(1) process with autoregressive coefficient 0.75.
In the case of the monetary policy shock (Figure 5), we again find that the equi-
librium responses of output and inflation are nearly the same in all three models,
though the ‘FF model’ is no longer quite so indistinguishable from the ‘NoFF’ model.
The most important effect of allowing for endogeneity of the credit spread is on the
implied responses of interest rates to the shock. Because credit contracts in response
to this shock (as noted earlier, though now by less than in Figure 2), the spread
between the lending rate and the deposit rate decreases, in accordance with the em-
pirical finding of Lown and Morgan (2002). This means that the deposit rate need
no longer decline as much as does the lending rate. Moreover, because the reduced
spread has an expansionary effect on aggregate demand, both output and inflation
decline slightly less in response to the shock than in the ‘NoFF’ model; this is also a
reason for the deposit rate to decline less, and in fact the reduction in its decline is
sufficient that the lending rate also declines slightly less than in the ‘NoFF’ model,
despite the reduction in the spread. Thus the most visible effect is on the predicted
response of the deposit rate, which is visibly smaller in the ‘FF model.’ The effects
of financial frictions are similarly mainly on the path of the deposit rate in the case
of a shock to the sales tax rate τ t (not shown).
The effects of financial frictions are somewhat less trivial in the case of the tech-
nology shock (Figure 6) and the shock to the wage markup (Figure 7). Though again
the largest effect is on the path of the deposit rate, in these cases the endogeneity
of the markup also has non-negligible effects on the equilibrium responses of output
and inflation. (The reason for the difference is that these are now shocks that have
larger effects on the path of credit, and so larger effects on the equilibrium spread
in the case of the convex technology.) Because an increase in productivity leads to
an expansion of credit, credit spreads now increase in the ‘FF model’; this is has a
contractionary effect on aggregate demand, so that output increases less, while in-
flation declines slightly more than in the ‘NoFF model’. Similar effects of financial
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frictions are observed in the case of a disturbance to the disutility of working (an
exogenous increase in the multiplicative factor H¯t in (1.22), not shown). The effects
of an increase in the wage markup (Figure 7) are likewise similar, but with opposite
signs.
The effects of financial frictions are even more significant in the case of a shock
to government purchases (Figure 8) or to the consumption demand of savers (Figure
9).50 These are both disturbances that crowd out the expenditure of private borrowers
(as the most interest-sensitive category of expenditure) to a significant extent, and
so substantially reduce equilibrium borrowing and credit spreads. In each case, the
reduction in spreads has a further expansionary effect on aggregate demand, so that
output increases by more than in the ‘NoFF’ model, while inflation rises slightly
instead of falling.
Note that the effect would be quite different in the case of a shock to the con-
sumption demand of borrowers rather than savers (not shown). In this case, private
credit would increase rather than decreasing, and by less than in Figure 9, because of
the greater interest-elasticity of the demand of borrowers; this would imply a small
increase in spreads, making the disturbance slightly less expansionary, but with a
less dramatic effect than in Figure 9.51 The aggregate effects of financial frictions are
even smaller in the case of a uniform increase in the consumption demand of both
types of households, since in this case the effects of the two types of expenditure on
equilibrium credit spreads partially offset one another.
Finally, the consequences of financial frictions are of particular qualitative sig-
nificance in the case of a disturbance to the path of government debt (Figure 10).
Here we consider a disturbance to fiscal policy that temporarily increases the level
of government debt, through a lump-sum transfer to households, which is then grad-
ually taken back over a period of time, so that the path of real government debt is
eventually the same as it would have been in the absence of the shock. In the case
of the ‘NoFF model’, Ricardian equivalence holds, as in the representative household
model; and so in these cases, the fiscal shock has no effect on output, inflation, or
interest rates. However, an increase in government borrowing crowds out private
50The shock considered here increases the value of cs(λ) by one percent for each possible value of
λ.
51The effect of financial frictions in this case is somewhat similar to the case of the technology
shock shown in Figure 5. See the Appendix for the corresponding figure.
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borrowing, and in the case of the convex intermediation technology, the reduced pri-
vate borrowing implies a reduction in spreads. This has an expansionary effect on
aggregate demand, with the consequence that both output and inflation increase, as
shown in the figure.52
We obtain similar conclusions in the case of other simple specifications of mone-
tary policy. For example, instead of a Taylor rule, we may assume that the central
bank adheres to a strict inflation target, adjusting the policy rate as necessary in order
to ensure that the inflation rate is unaffected by any exogenous disturbances. Once
again, we find that neither heterogeneity nor financial frictions make much difference
for the equilibrium responses in the case of the linear intermediation technology (we
suppress these figures). In the case of the convex intermediation technology, equi-
librium responses under the ‘FF model’ are slightly different, in the case of shocks
that cause substantial endogenous variation in credit spreads. For example, Figure
11 shows the equilibrium responses under this kind of policy in the case of a shock to
the demand of savers (the same shock as in Figure 9), for the same three alternative
models as in Figures 5-10. Again, the policy rate is increased substantially more in
the ‘FF model’ than in the ‘NoFF model’, because of the reduction in the spread.
And again the increase in output in response to the shock is somewhat greater in the
‘FF model’; however, this effect is much less dramatic than in Figure 9. While the
reduction in credit spreads has a small effect on the aggregate-supply relation — the
output level consistent with price stability is slightly increased — the primary effect
is on the IS relation (the average real interest rate consistent with a zero output gap
is increased) and on the relation between the policy rate and the average interest rate
that is relevant for aggregate-demand determination (the lower spread means that a
higher policy rate is needed to achieve a given average interest rate). The latter two
effects make an unadjusted Taylor rule a substantially more expansionary policy in
response to this kind of shock (as shown in Figure 9), but they are automatically can-
celed under a (correctly implemented) inflation targeting policy, so that equilibrium
52Ricardian equivalence does not hold precisely in the ‘FF model’ even in the case of the linear
intermediation technology. However, in this case (not shown) there is no reduction in credit spreads
in response to the shock, and the only consequence for aggregate demand comes from the reduction
in the resources used by the banking sector, so that shock is actually (very slightly) contractionary
in this case. (See the Appendix for the corresponding figure.) But there is very little difference in
the predictions of the ‘NoFF’ and ‘FF’ models in the case of that technology, so that we omit the
figure here.
39
outcomes are not so different in the economies with and without financial frictions.
The consequences of financial frictions are even more modest in the case of the other
kinds of disturbances previously discussed (figures not shown here).
To sum up, we find that under an empirically realistic calibration of the average
size of credit spreads, the mere existence of a positive credit spread does not imply
any substantial quantitative difference for our model’s predictions, either about the
effects of a monetary policy shock or about the effects of other kinds of exogenous dis-
turbances under a given systematic monetary policy. What matters somewhat more
is the degree to which there is variation in credit spreads. If spreads vary endoge-
nously (as in our model with a convex intermediation technology), then the effects of
disturbances are somewhat different, especially in the case of types of disturbances
— such as variations in government borrowing, or changes in the relative spending
opportunities available to savers as opposed to borrowers — that particularly affect
the evolution of the equilibrium volume of private credit.
Another important difference of the model with credit frictions is the possibil-
ity of exogenous disturbances to the banking sector itself, represented by exogenous
variation in either the intermediation technology Ξt(b) or the intermediation markup
µbt(b). Again, these disturbances matter to the determination of aggregate output,
inflation and interest rates primarily to the extent that they imply variation in credit
spreads. The equilibrium effects of disturbances of this kind under alternative mon-
etary policies are considered further below (see Figures 16-17).
3 Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy
We turn now to the implications of credit frictions for optimal monetary policy. We
shall suppose that the objective of policy is to maximize the average ex ante expected












































Again, the derivation is provided in the Appendix. Note that the final term in (3.2)
represents the average disutility of working, averaging both over the entire continuum
of types of labor j and over the two types of households, using the model of equilibrium
labor supply discussed in section 1.2.
While one might reasonably consider the optimal use of fiscal policy for stabiliza-
tion purposes as well, we shall here consider only the optimal conduct of monetary
policy, taking as given the state-contingent evolution of the fiscal variables {τ t, bgt}.
The problem with which we are concerned is thus the choice of state-contingent paths
for the endogenous variables {Yt, λbt , λst , ibt , idt , Zt,Πt,∆t, bt}, consistent with the struc-
tural relations (1.8)–(1.9), (1.14)–(1.17), (1.25)–(1.26), and (1.27)–(1.28), so as to
maximize (3.1). Note that there is one fewer structural relations per period than
endogenous variables, so that there is one dimension of variation of monetary policy
each period, which may be thought of as the central bank’s choice of the policy rate
idt .
We can analyze the solution to this optimization problem, by differentiating a La-
grangian to obtain a system of first-order conditions, that take the form of nonlinear
(expectational) stochastic difference equations. (Details are given in the Appendix.)
A first important conclusion, demonstrated in the Appendix, is that w hen there are
no stochastic disturbances (i.e., each of the exogenous variables in ξ˜t takes a con-
stant value), the first-order conditions for optimality admit a stationary (or steady
state) solution, in which the rate of inflation is zero. Hence under an optimal policy
commitment, in the absence of stochastic disturbances the inflation rate will eventu-
ally converge to zero;53 and in the case of small enough stochastic disturbances, the
53Under a once-and-for-all commitment chosen to maximize the objective (3.1) at some initial
date, under no constraints other than those required for a perfect foresight equilibrium from the
time of adoption of the policy commitment onward — the “Ramsey” policy problem — a higher
inflation rate will be chosen initially, in order to exploit the short-run aggregate-supply trade-off
without having to take account of any consequences of anticipation of such inflation in the period
prior to adoption of the policy; but the policy will involve a commitment to eventually reduce
the inflation rate to zero, since the long-run inflation commitment internalizes the consequences of
anticipation of the inflation rate in prior periods. (See Woodford, 2003, chap. 7, for discussion of
this in the context of the basic NK model.) Optimal policy “from a timeless perspective,” in the
sense defined in Woodford (2003, chap. 7) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), instead involves zero
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optimal policy commitment will involve an inflation rate that fluctuates asymptoti-
cally around zero. To the extent that the disturbances are small enough for a linear
approximation to the equilibrium relations to provide an adequate approximation to
the equilibrium dynamics, optimal policy involves a long-run average inflation rate of
zero, even in the stochastic case.
This result generalizes the one obtained by Benigno and Woodford (2005) for
the representative-household case, and implies that the optimal inflation target is
independent of the (average) severity of the distortions resulting from credit frictions,
just as it is independent of the severity of the steady-state distortions resulting from
market power in the goods or labor markets or from distorting taxes. This indicates
a first important respect in which conclusions about optimal policy derived from a
model that abstracts from financial frictions continue to apply when one allows for
such frictions. The result also justifies our attention here only to the consequences of
alternative policies that imply a long-run average inflation rate near zero (as in our
analysis of the consequences of a Taylor rule in section 2); since we know that the
optimal policy commitment involves inflation fluctuations around zero, we can restrict
our analysis to policies with that property, both when seeking to further characterize
optimal policy, and when investigating the desirability of simple policy rules that are
intended to approximate optimal policy.
3.1 Linear-Quadratic Analysis
Under certain simplifying assumptions, we can obtain an analytical solution for the
optimal state-contingent policy — or more precisely, for a linear approximation to
optimal policy, in the case of small enough fluctuations around the optimal (zero-
inflation) long-run steady state — using the method of linear-quadratic approximation
introduced in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and further expounded by Benigno
and Woodford (2007).54 Under these assumptions, we can derive a quadratic loss
inflation at all times, in the absence of stochastic disturbances.
54These simplifying assumptions are not required in order to compute a valid LQ approximation
to our policy problem, as explained in Benigno and Woodford (2007). However, in general, the
algebraic expression of the solution to the LQ problem will be complex, so we discuss it here only
in a special case allowing a solution of a simple form. The same general method is used, however,
to approximately characterize optimal policy in the numerical results presented below, that do not
rely upon the simplifying assumptions introduced in this section.
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function for monetary stabilization policy with the property that minimization of the
loss function is equivalent (in the case of small enough disturbances) to maximiza-
tion of the utility-based objective (3.1). The linear policy rule that minimizes the
quadratic loss function subject to the linear constraints obtained by log-linearizing
the model structural relations (as in section 2.1) then provides a linear approximation
to optimal policy.
We begin by using structural relation (1.17) together with the definition Ωt ≡
λbt/λ
s




t as functions of Yt,Ωt,Ξt, and the exogenous distur-
bances. Substituting these solutions into (3.2), we obtain a period utility function
U˜(Yt,Ωt,Ξt,∆t; ξ˜t) to replace the function U defined in (3.2). We then compute a
quadratic (Taylor-series) approximation to the function U˜ around the values of its
arguments in the zero-inflation steady state, (Y¯ , Ω¯, Ξ¯, 1; 0). This takes an especially
simple form under the following special assumptions: (i) the steady-state tax dis-
tortion τ¯ exactly cancels the distortion resulting from market power in the goods
markets (1 − τ = µp ≡ θ/(θ − 1)), so that in the zero-inflation steady state, price
is equal to marginal cost; (ii) there is no steady-state wage markup (µ¯w = 1); (iii)
the steady-state credit spread ω¯ = 0 (which, because of relation (2.6), implies that
Ω¯ = 1 as well); and (iv) there are no resources consumed by the intermediary sector
in steady state (Ξ¯ = 0). Note that the assumed absence of steady-state distortions
of any of these kinds does not mean that we cannot consider the effects of these dis-
tortions; as with the other exogenous disturbances, we consider the effects of small
departures from the steady-state values. But in the special case considered in this
section, each of these distortions is assumed to be of order O(||ξ||) in the notation
of Woodford (2003, chap. 6). Finally, we also assume (v) that the gradient Ξ¯b = 0
in steady state as well, so that any endogenous variation in the resources used by
the banking sector is of at most second order, though we allow for variations in the
intercept Ξt(b¯) that are of order O(||ξ||).55
In this special case, the Taylor series approximation to the period utility function
55This last assumption is not necessary in order for the approximation (3.3) to average utility to be
valid, but it is necessary in order for the terms in (3.3) that depend on policy to be purely quadratic,
i.e., for them to include no linear terms. This last condition is necessary in order for the loss function
to be evaluated to second order under alternative policies using only linear approximations to the
model’s structural relations, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 6) and Benigno and Woodford
(2007).
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takes the simple form
U˜t = − λ¯Y¯
2
{




where the term “t.i.p.” collects terms that are independent of monetary policy (be-
cause they depend only on exogenous disturbances) and the residual is of at most
third order in the amplitude of the disturbances. Here λ is the common steady-state
marginal utility of income of all households (under a calibration in which Ω¯ = 0); σ¯
is the “aggregate” intertemporal elasticity of substitution defined in (2.8) above; the
coefficient ψΩ > 0 is defined in the Appendix; and hats denote percentage deviations
from the steady-state values of the various variables, as in section 2.1. As in equation
(2.13), Yˆ nt denotes the percentage deviation of the “natural rate of output” — here
equivalent to both the efficient level of output, given preferences and technology, and
to the flexible-price equilibrium level of output in the absence of time-varying tax dis-
tortions, wage markups, or financial frictions — from the steady-state level of output.
This variable is a function purely of the exogenous disturbances (described further
in the Appendix); and it is exactly the same function of the exogenous disturbances
as in the basic NK model (as expounded in Woodford, 2003, chap. 3), with the
exception that we must in general take a weighted average of the preference shocks
of the two types of households, rather than assuming that their preferences always
shift in exactly the same way, and use σ¯ in place of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of the representative household.
Taking a discounted sum of these terms, and using a second-order Taylor series







βtLt + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (3.4)
where K > 0 and the period loss function is of the form
Lt = pi
2
t + λy(Yˆt − Yˆ nt )2 + λΩΩˆ2t + λΞΞbtbˆt, (3.5)
for certain weights λy, λΩ, λΞ > 0 defined in the Appendix. Maximization of average
expected utility is thus equivalent (to the order of approximation required here) to
minimization of the expected discounted value of the loss function (3.5). And because
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the terms in (3.5) are purely quadratic, the loss function can be evaluated to second
order using only a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics of the en-
dogenous variables under a given policy. Hence it is possible to use the log-linearized
structural relations (derived in section 2.1) as the constraints in our (approximate)
optimal policy problem. We thus obtain a linear-quadratic (LQ) problem, the solution
to which provides a log-linear (approximate) characterization of optimal policy.
It is noteworthy that in (3.5), both the form of the output-gap stabilization ob-
jective (i.e., the definition of Yˆ nt ) and the relative weight λy placed on this objective
are identical (as functions of the model parameters) to those in the corresponding
derivation for the basic NK model, modulo the need to “average” the preferences of
the two types of households, as discussed above. In particular, not only is the output
gap appearing here the same one that appears in the aggregate-supply relation (2.13)
— when that relation is written in such a way that the trade-off between inflation
variations and output-gap variations, given inflation expectations, shifts only in re-
sponse to variations in distorting taxes, wage markups, or financial frictions — just as
in the basic NK model; but in addition the weight is given by λy = κ/θ, where κ is the
slope of the inflation/output-gap tradeoff in (2.13), again as in the basic NK model.
Thus in the special case that there are no financial frictions (i.e., ωt = 0,Ξt = 0 at
all times), so that the last two terms in (3.5) vanish, along with the non-standard
terms in (2.13), both the welfare-based loss function and the aggregate-supply rela-
tion (that defines the available trade-off between dynamic paths for the two variables
in the loss function) are of exactly the same form as in the basic NK model, once one
defines “average” variables appropriately. The existence of preference heterogeneity
of the kind assumed in the present model — heterogeneity both with respect to the
interest-sensitivity of different units’ expenditure decisions and with respect to the
time variation in their opportunities for productive expenditure — does not in itself
require any substantial modification of the theory of optimal monetary stabilization
policy.
If we instead allow for time-varying financial frictions (though no steady-state
distortions, as explained above), but assume that there is no endogenous variation
in these frictions — i.e., that {ωt,Ξt} are exogenous processes, independent of the
evolution of private indebtedness56 — we continue to obtain a very simple charac-
56For example, we may assume that (i) no real resources are used in intermediation, so that
Ξt(b) = 0, and the credit spread ωt is a pure financial markup; and (ii) the markup µbt (and hence
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terization of optimal policy. In this case, the final term in (3.5) is zero, and the
penultimate term is independent of policy (to second order), since the log-linear ap-
proximate structural relation (2.6) implies that if {ωt} is an exogenous process, {Ωt}
is also an exogenous process, at least up to a residual that is at most of second order,
so that Ωˆ2t is exogenous, at least up to a residual of order O(||ξ||3). Hence the loss
function can be written (ignoring terms independent of policy) in the standard New







where xt ≡ Yˆt−Yˆ nt is the welfare-relevant output gap. In this case, the appropriate
objectives of stabilization policy remain as in the basic NK model; the only differences
made by financial frictions relate to the feasible paths for inflation and the output
gap, and to the path for the policy rate required to implement given paths for inflation
and the output gap.
Time-variation in financial frictions does matter for the optimal conduct of mon-
etary policy, because they shift both the IS relation (2.10) and the aggregate-supply
relation (2.13)). However, only the latter relation represents a constraint upon the
set of achievable outcomes for the target variables, inflation and the output gap. And
the effect of financial frictions on this relation is purely to add an additional additive
disturbance term. The first-order conditions that characterize the solution to the LQ
problem of minimizing (3.6) subject to the constraint that (2.13) hold each period
are unaffected by these disturbances, and so is the optimal target criterion that ex-
presses the linear relation that must exist between the evolution of inflation and of
the output gap in order for the first-order conditions for optimality to be satisfied.
Just as in the basic NK model, the optimal target criterion is of the form57
pit + (λy/κ)(xt − xt−1) = 0. (3.7)
While the state-contingent paths for inflation and the output gap that satisfy this
criterion are different in the case of a time-varying credit spread, the criterion that
the spread ωt) evolves exogenously, and is unaffected by the volume of bank lending.
57See Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for derivation of this characterization of optimal policy in the
case of the basic NK model, and for further discussion of the implementation of optimal policy using
a target criterion.
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the central bank should use at each point in time to determine if policy remains on
track is unchanged. Not only can optimal policy still be characterized as “flexible
inflation targeting,” but the optimal target criterion is of an identical form to what
is optimal in the absence of credit frictions.
The implementation of an optimal policy does require the central bank to monitor
the varying size of the credit frictions — more precisely, the varying size of credit
spreads — in order to determine how it must act in order to ensure fulfillment of
the target criterion (3.7). These matter for two reasons. First, the paths of inflation
and the output gap consistent with (3.7) depend in general on the evolution of credit
spreads, because of the effect of those spreads on the aggregate-supply trade-off (2.13).
And second, the path of policy rates required to implement given (feasible) paths for
inflation and output depends on the path of credit spreads, because of their effects
on both the relation (2.10) between average interest rates and expenditure and the
relation (2.11) between the policy rate and the relevant “average” interest rate.
The required adjustment of the policy rate follows from standard treatments (e.g.,
Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003, chap. 7) of the optimal interest-rate response
to “cost-push shocks” and variations in the natural rate of interest in the context of
the basic NK model. Variations in credit spreads result in a total cost-push term in
the aggregate-supply relation equal to58
uFFt = ut + ξsΩΩˆt,
where ut ≡ ξ(µˆwt + τˆ t) is the cost-push term in the absence of financial frictions (but
taking account of preference heterogeneity), and the coefficient sΩ is defined as in
(2.9); and they similarly result in a natural rate of interest (understood to mean the
real value of the relevant average rate of interest that would be required to maintain
a zero output gap at all times) equal to
rn,FFt = r
n
t − sΩ(Ωˆt − EtΩˆt+1),
where rnt is similarly the natural rate of interest in the absence of financial frictions
(but taking account of preference heterogeneity). The standard theory of how “the
interest rate” should be adjusted in response to exogenous variations in the processes
{ut, rnt } continues to apply under this extension of the basic NK model, but it now
58The cost-push effect of variations in Ωˆt here has a simpler expression than in (2.13), because of
the assumption in this section that Ω¯ = 1, which implies that γb = pib.
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should be understood to determine the optimal operating target for the average in-
terest rate iavgt . The required adjustment of the central bank’s policy rate i
d
t is then
given by (2.11), and this relation is also shifted when credit spreads change.
The precise consequences of these several factors for the proper adjustment of the
policy rate can be given a simple answer if we make still more special assumptions. In
the “symmetric” case in which sbσb = ssσs, sΩ = 0, and as a result variation in credit
spreads has neither a cost-push effect nor any effect on the natural rate of interest.
In this case, the optimal state-contingent evolution of inflation and the output gap
depend only on the evolution of the exogenous disturbances {µˆwt , τˆ t}; the implied
optimal evolution of aggregate output depends also on the evolution of preferences
and technology, but is similarly independent of the time variation in credit spreads.
The required evolution of the average interest rate iavgt in order to support these
paths is also independent of the evolution of credit spreads. Time-variation in credit
spreads matters for the optimal conduct of monetary policy only because the policy
rate associated with a given average interest rate changes, as indicated by (2.11). We
obtain a simple conclusion: an increase in the credit spread ωt reduces the optimal
policy rate idt , by an amount precisely equal to fraction pib of the increase in the credit
spread.
In this simple case, at least, we confirm the appropriateness of the kind of rule
of thumb suggested by McCulley and Toloui (2008) and Taylor (2008): an increase
in credit spreads justifies a reduction in the policy rate (i.e., the federal funds rate
operating target, in the case of the U.S. Federal Reserve), below what would otherwise
be justified by current aggregate conditions, by an amount that is proportional to the
increase in credit spreads. However, the appropriate adjustment is not by the full
amount of the increase in credit spreads, as these authors suggest. That would be
appropriate only if it were optimal for the rate faced by borrowers to be unaffected
by the increased credit frictions, regardless of the consequences for the interest rate
obtained by savers. In fact, a change in the interest rate obtained by savers creates
distortions, just as a change in the interest rate faced by borrowers does; and when
it is necessary to increase the spread between these two interest rates, necessarily
increasing distortions of one kind or the other, it is optimal to share the adjustment
burden by increasing each kind of distortion to some extent. If there are equal
numbers of savers and borrowers, the optimal rule in the present special case would
be to “split the difference,” and reduce the policy rate by half the increase in the
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spread.
Matters are more complicated, of course, if we assume that either the resources
used in financial intermediation, the size of credit spreads, or both depend on the
volume of bank lending. Rather than seek analytical results in the more general case,
we present some illustrative numerical calculations of optimal policy in calibrated
examples, and investigate the degree to which the insights suggested by the analysis
of this simple case continue to apply.
3.2 Numerical Analysis
In order to check the degree to which the results obtained above for a special case
continue to hold, at least approximately, under more general assumptions, we numer-
ically analyze optimal policy in the calibrated economies for which we have already
analyzed the consequences of two simple policy rule in section 2. Under assumptions
more general than those used in the previous section, we can characterize the optimal
responses to exogenous disturbances of various sorts by deriving the first-order condi-
tions that characterize optimal (Ramsey) policy — the problem of maximizing (3.1)
subject to constraints (1.8)–(1.9), (1.14)–(1.17), (1.25)–(1.26), and (1.27)–(1.28) —
and then log-linearizing them around the zero-inflation optimal steady state. The
resulting log-linear equations can be solved for log-linear optimal dynamic responses
of the various endogenous variables to (small enough) random shocks to each of the
exogenous disturbance processes.
A useful question about these optimal responses is the degree to which they can
be achieved through one or another rule for the conduct of monetary policy. Given
our results for the special case treated in the previous section, one obvious candidate
for a rule is flexible inflation targeting, here understood to mean a commitment to
adjust the policy rate as necessary to ensure that the target criterion (3.7) holds at
all times.59 Other simple proposals that we shall consider include the two policies
59More precisely, the target criterion that we assume is the one that characterizes optimal policy
in the representative-household model. The target criterion discussed in the previous section cor-
responded to optimal policy in a representative household model in which the steady-state level of
output is efficient, which required that 1 − τ = µp ≡ θ/(θ − 1). More generally, the optimal target
criterion for the representative-household model continues to be of the form (3.7), but the definition
of the output gap xt and the relative weight λy are slightly different, as explained in Benigno and
Woodford (2005).
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considered for illustrative purposes in section 2, namely, the Taylor rule (2.14) with
the coefficients assumed in section 2.2, and strict inflation targeting.
The equilibrium responses of the endogenous variables to a technology shock (of
exactly the same kind previously considered in Figures 3 and 6) under each of these
alternative monetary policies are shown in Figure 12. (The model parameterization
is again the one with a convex intermediation technology, as in Figures 5-11.) The
solid line (labeled ‘Optimal’) indicates the equilibrium responses to the increase in
productivity under the optimal policy. The dashed line (labeled ‘PiStab’) instead
indicates responses under a policy that fully stabilizes inflation (i.e., strict inflation
targeting); the line marked with + signs (labeled ‘Taylor’) indicates responses under
policy conducted in accordance with the Taylor rule; and the line marked with x’s
(labeled ‘FlexTarget’) indicates responses under the flexible inflation targeting policy.
In the case of this kind of shock, the aggregate-supply relation (2.13) implies that
there is little inconsistency between inflation stabilization and output-gap stabiliza-
tion; and as a consequence strict inflation targeting and flexible inflation targeting
are barely distinguishable policies.60 They are also both very close to the optimal
policy, confirming that in this respect the analytical results of the previous section
continue to provide a good approximation. The Taylor rule is instead much less close
to an optimal policy, because it requires policy to be tightened in response to the
output increase, even when this does not represent high output relative to the natu-
ral rate (which is increased by the technology shock). Similar results are obtained in
the case of exogenous shocks to the disutility of labor, the demand of borrowers, or
to the path of government debt (none of which are shown here): in each case, there
is sufficiently little tension between the requirements of inflation stabilization and of
output-gap stabilization that flexible inflation targeting and strict inflation targeting
are similar policies, and both are fairly close to optimal policy (while the Taylor rule
is much less close).
Figure 13 shows the corresponding equilibrium responses in the case of a shock to
the wage markup (of the kind previously assumed in Figure 7), under the same four
alternative policies. This case is interesting because it is one in which strict inflation
targeting is clearly not an optimal policy, even in the representative-household model,
owing to the substantial “cost-push” effect of such a shock. (However, even in this
60In fact, if we did not allow for endogeneity of the credit spread, as in the model with a linear
intermediation technology, they would not differ at all.
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case, strict inflation targeting is still more similar to optimal policy than is adherence
to the Taylor rule.) The figure shows that in the case of this kind of shock, as with the
other “supply shocks” discussed above, flexible inflation targeting is nonetheless quite
a close approximation to optimal policy. A similar result is obtained in the case of a
shock to the sales tax rate (not shown): strict and flexible inflation targeting are no
longer nearly identical policies, but flexible inflation targeting closely approximates
optimal policy.
Figure 14 shows the corresponding equilibrium responses to a shock to the level of
government purchases (of the kind previously assumed in Figures 4 and 8); and Figure
15 shows the responses to a shock to the demand of savers (of the kind previously
assumed in Figures 9 and 11). In the case of a shock to government purchases, strict
inflation targeting is again not optimal,61 and in at least some respects the Taylor rule
is in this case closer to the optimal policy than would be strict inflation targeting.
Nonetheless, once again flexible inflation targeting is the closest to optimal policy
of the set of simple policy rules considered here, though optimal policy would be
slightly tighter in the period of the shock. In the case of a shock to the demand of
savers as well, flexible inflation targeting is the closest to optimal policy, though again
optimal policy would be slightly tighter in the period of the shock. Flexible inflation
targeting is nonetheless a slightly tighter policy in response to the expansionary shock
than strict inflation targeting would be, and in particular it prevents the persistent
increase in inflation that would be allowed by the Taylor rule.
Finally, Figure 16 shows the corresponding equilibrium responses in the case of a
shock to the financial markup µbt , of a size sufficient to increase the credit spread ωt
by one percentage point (annualized). This kind of shock (not discussed in section 2.3
because there is no analogous shock in the models without financial frictions) would
be quite contractionary if monetary policy were conducted in accordance with an
unadjusted Taylor rule.62 But as in the case of a productivity shock (shown in Figure
12) or a shock to the disutility of labor supply, either kind of inflation targeting is
much closer to optimal policy. Yet even in this case, flexible inflation targeting is not
quite an equivalent policy to strict inflation targeting, and is closer to the optimal
61This would be true even in the representative-household model, given the existence of steady-
state distortions, as discussed by Benigno and Woodford (2005).
62This effect could be substantially mitigated in the case of a spread-adjusted Taylor rule, as
discussed in section 3.3 below.
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policy.
Overall, our conclusion is that while the additional distortions that were omitted in
the special case for which we were able to give an analytical characterization of optimal
policy in section 3.1 are of at least some significance in our calibrated model, the
flexible inflation targeting rule (3.7) continues to provide a fairly good approximation
to optimal policy, in response to each of the variety of types of exogenous disturbances
discussed above. Since this is also the rule that characterizes optimal policy in the
basic NK model, in at least this sense the basic NK model remains quite a good guide
to policy in the kind of environment that we consider. Of course, it is important to
remember that the policy prescription provided by (3.7) is not a complete description
of the way in which the policy rate should be adjusted: it is still necessary to use a
model of the transmission mechanism to determine what adjustments of the policy
rate are needed to ensure that the target criterion is satisfied. And the model used
for this latter purpose needs to be one that takes account of the credit frictions — in
particular, that takes account of the variations over time in the size of credit spreads.
But the target criterion around which monetary policy deliberations are structured
may not need to be changed in response to the existence of credit frictions.
3.3 A Spread-Adjusted Taylor Rule
The numerical results of the previous section show that a simple Taylor rule of the
form (2.14) does not provide too close an approximation of optimal policy in the case
of a number of different types of possible disturbances. But might an adjustment
of the rule to take account of credit frictions cure some of the problems with the
unadjusted Taylor rule? In particular, does the proposal of authors such as McCulley
and Toloui (2008) or Taylor (2008), to adjust the federal funds rate operating target
in response to changes in credit spreads, for any given level of inflation and output,
represent an improvement upon the classic proposal of Taylor (1993)?
Let us consider a generalization of (2.14) of the form
ıˆdt = φpipit + φyYˆt − φωωˆt, (3.8)
for some coefficient 0 ≤ φω ≤ 1. (We now omit the random term ²mt , as there is
clearly nothing desirable about unnecessary randomization of policy.) This kind of
rule lowers the intercept of the Taylor rule by an amount equal to fraction φω of the
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credit spread. In the case that φω = 1, the rule is equivalent to having a conventional
Taylor rule, but for the lending rate rather than the deposit rate (or interbank funding
rate). The case φω = 1 formalizes the proposal of McCulley and Toloui (2008), and
also captures the idea of proposals that the funds rate should be lowered when credit
spreads increase, so as to prevent the increase in spreads from “effectively tightening
monetary conditions” in the absence of any justification from inflation or high output
relative to potential.
Figure 17 shows the responses of endogenous variables to a “financial shock” of
the same kind as in Figure 16, but for variant monetary policy rules of the form
(3.8). The response labeled ‘Taylor’ (the dashed line) again corresponds to the stan-
dard Taylor rule (the case φω = 0), and is the same as in Figure 16. The response
labeled ‘Taylor+25’ corresponds to the case φω = 0.25, and so on up to ‘Taylor+100,’
corresponding to the case φω = 1. The figure also again plots the responses under
optimal policy, shown by the solid line.
We observe that adjusting the intercept of the Taylor rule in response to changes
in the credit spread can indeed largely remedy the defects of the simple Taylor rule, in
the case of a shock to the economy of this kind. And the optimal degree of adjustment
is close to 100 percent, as proposed by McCulley and Toloui and by Taylor.63 Figure
18 shows that the same is true in the case of a shock to the level of government
debt (of the kind considered in Figure 10). In the case of the “financial shock”, the
unadjusted Taylor rule is too contractionary, while in the case of the fiscal shock it is
too expansionary; but in both cases, the spread adjustment corrects the Taylor rule
in the right direction and even (for the parameter values assumed here) by almost
exactly the right amount.
This is not true, however, more generally. Figure 19 shows the corresponding
equilibrium responses to a shock to the demand of savers (of the kind considered in
Figures 9, 11, and 15). In the case of this kind of shock, the unadjusted Taylor rule is
too expansionary, and (since the shock decreases credit spreads) a spread adjustment
modifies policy in the right direction, just as in Figure 18. But in this case, a 100
percent spread adjustment would be too contractionary; instead, a 50 percent spread
adjustment most closely approximates optimal policy. Similar conclusions apply in
the case of a shock to government purchases, shown in Figure 20. Again the spread
63This last conclusion is somewhat sensitive to the parameterization of our model, even in the
case of this particular type of disturbance. See the Appendix for further discussion.
53
adjustment is in the right direction, but a 100 percent adjustment would be far too
much; in this case, the 25 percent spread adjustment leads to responses most similar
to optimal policy.
In other cases, even a 100 percent spread adjustment may not be enough to
eliminate the defects of the simple Taylor rule. Figure 21 shows the corresponding
equilibrium responses to a shock to the demand of borrowers. (As with the shock
to the demand of savers, we here assume a preference shock that increases cb(λ) by
one percent for each possible value of λ.) In this case, a spread adjustment modifies
policy in the right direction (i.e., it loosens policy), but even a 100 percent spread
adjustment is not nearly enough to produce responses similar to those under optimal
policy.64 The unadjusted Taylor rule tightens policy too much in response to this
kind of disturbance, but this is not primarily a consequence of the increase in credit
spreads resulting from the shock; indeed, the Taylor rule would tighten too much in
response to this shock even in an economy in which the credit spread is exogenous
(as in the case of the linear intermediation technology discussed above). Indeed, the
increase in credit spreads is fairly modest in this case, under our parameterization of
the model, so even a full offset for the increase in the credit spread does not correct
policy by nearly enough.
This is true to an even greater extent in the case of a technology shock, as shown in
Figure 22. Though the spread adjustment again modifies the Taylor rule in the right
direction (making it less excessively contractionary in response to the surge in output
that is justified by increased productivity), it has relatively little effect on equilibrium
outcomes, given the modest increase in spreads. A similar comment applies in the
case of shocks to the disutility of working, to the tax rate, or to the wage markup
(not shown).
It is interesting to observe that in all of these cases, the spread adjustment modifies
the simple Taylor rule in the right direction. There is thus some generality to the
conclusion that the Taylor rule is too tight in the case of shocks that increase credit
spreads (in most of the above cases, because credit increases) and too loose in the
case of shocks that reduce credit spreads. However, this does not mean that the
change in credit spreads, even if accurately observed by the central bank, would be
64We do not attempt to calculate the size of spread adjustment that would best approximate
optimal policy in this case; it would clearly be a spread adjustment that would be excessive in the
case of the other types of shocks already discussed, and so not an interesting policy proposal.
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an ideal indicator of the degree to which a simple Taylor rule is likely to be biased as
a guide to welfare-maximizing policy. For the adjustment of the Taylor-rule intercept
in response to the shock that would best approximate optimal policy is not the same
multiple of the change in the credit spread in all cases — indeed, the optimal factor of
proportionality varies widely in the cases considered above.65 Thus simply tracking
credit spreads would not provide enough information to make the correct adjustment:
a central bank would also need to determine which kind of disturbance is responsible
for an observed change in credit spreads.
Can one usefully summarize the way in which such information about the partic-
ular disturbances currently affecting the economy should be used to determine the
appropriate adjustment of the policy rate? Here it is worth noting that the flexible
inflation targeting rule appears superior as a general rule of thumb to any member
of the family of spread-adjusted Taylor rules. The targeting rule implies naturally
implies a certain degree of adjustment for changes in spreads. This is because the
targeting rule requires the central bank to determine the path for its policy rate con-
sistent with projected paths of inflation and output with a certain desirable property;
this requires it to take account of (and to offset, to the extent that it can with a single
instrument) the effects of changes in credit spreads on the structural relations dis-
cussed in section 2. As a simple example, an increase in the credit spread increases
the gap between iavgt (the interest rate that is relevant to aggregate demand determi-
nation) and the policy rate idt , and given any desired degree of adjustment of i
avg
t in
response to an economic disturbance, the policy rate will instead be raised less (or
lowered more) in the case of an increase in credit spreads, in order to achieve the
desired effect on iavgt . This effect alone would justify a credit spread adjustment of
50 percent (in our calibrated model), as a result of equation (2.11). However, this
is not the only adjustment that a forecast-targeting central bank should take into
account; credit spreads also shift the “IS” and aggregate-supply relations as well, as
discussed in section 2. Nor are adjustments for those affects the only ones that differ-
entiate a properly implemented targeting regime from a simple Taylor rule; forecast
65And of course, no proportional adjustment would fully implement optimal policy in any of these
cases. Ideally, the adjustment of the Taylor-rule intercept would have dynamics somewhat different
from the dynamics of the equilibrium response of the credit spread. For example, one observes in
Figures 19 and 20 that the optimal adjustment factor would be larger in the period of the shock
than in subsequent periods, in each of these cases.
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targeting also requires that the central bank take account of shifts in the natural rate
of output, shifts in the natural rate of interest, and shifts in the aggregate-supply
relation due to “cost-push” disturbances, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chaps. 4,
7). Sometimes the adjustments of the policy rate required by considerations of the
latter types will happen to be in the same direction as would be implied by a “spread
adjustment”, but this is fortuitous, and the targeting rule provides a better way of
thinking about the nature and magnitude of the appropriate adjustment of policy.66
While implementation of such a rule requires a greater degree of sophistication (and
a greater degree of accurate real-time assessment of current conditions) on the part
of the central bank, a rule of this kind provides a better guide to what the central
bank should be seeking to do at each point in time.
3.4 Should Policy Respond to Variations in Aggregate Credit?
Some have suggested that because of imperfections in financial intermediation, it is
more important for central banks to monitor and respond to variations in the volume
of bank lending than would be the case if the “frictionless” financial markets of Arrow-
Debreu theory were more nearly descriptive of reality. A common recommendation in
this vein is that monetary policy should be used to help to stabilize aggregate private
credit, by tightening policy when credit is observed to grow unusually strongly and
loosening policy when credit is observed to contract. For example, Christiano et
al. (2007a) propose that a Taylor rule that is adjusted in response to variations in
aggregate credit may represent an improvement upon an unadjusted Taylor rule.
In order to consider the possible advantages of such an adjustment, we now pro-
pose to replace (2.14) by a rule of the form
ıˆdt = φpipit + φyYˆt + φbbˆt, (3.9)
for some coefficient φb, the sign of which we shall not prejudge. (Christiano et al.,
like most proponents of credit-based policies, argue for the desirability of a positive
coefficient.) Figures 23-26 present the equilibrium responses to four different kinds
66For example, in the case of the technology shock in Figure 22, the main reasons why the simple
Taylor rule calls for too tight a policy are that it ignores the increase in the natural rate of output
and the reduction in the natural rate of interest; the fact that in the simulations shown in the figure
there is also a modest increase in the credit spread is coincidental.
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of exogenous disturbances in the case of five different rules of the form (3.9), corre-
sponding to five different possible values of φb. The responses labeled “Taylor” are
again those implied by the unadjusted Taylor rule (the case φb = 0); “Taylor+025”
and “Taylor+050” refer to rules in which φb is equal to .025 or .050 respectively; and
“Taylor-025” and “Taylor-050” are rules in which φb is equal to -.025 or -.050 respec-
tively. For purposes of comparison, the responses associated with optimal policy are
again plotted as a solid line in each figure.
In the case of a financial markup shock (Figure 23), the unadjusted Taylor rule
makes policy too tight, as previously shown in Figure 16: both output and inflation
fall significantly in response to the shock, when they should not. Moreover, private
credit contracts in response to this shock, and so one might suppose that a Taylor
rule that responds to credit with a coefficient φb > 0 would represent an improve-
ment. However, Figure 23 shows that in our model, the dynamics of private credit
in response to the shock do not match very well the dynamics of the adjustment of
the Taylor rule needed to implement optimal policy. A value of φb between .025 and
.050 will suffice to prevent the undesired initial decline in inflation at the time of the
shock, but such a modification of the Taylor rule will then be too inflationary in sub-
sequent quarters. Moreover, such an adjustment does little to prevent the contraction
of output in response to the shock; any value of φb large enough to solve that problem
to any substantial extent will be much too inflationary, and will eventually stimulate
output too much in later quarters as well. The problem is that the contraction in
private credit in response to the shock is too persistent for a simple contemporaneous
response to the level of private credit to represent an improvement upon the unad-
justed Taylor rule. (Because of the dynamics of private debt implied by (1.26), the
effects upon aggregate credit are substantially more persistent than the shock to the
credit spread may be.)
The idea of adjusting the Taylor rule to incorporate a positive response to credit
makes even less sense in the case of other kinds of disturbances. For example, Figure
24 shows the equilibrium responses to a shock to government purchases under the
same set of alternative policies as in Figure 23. In the case of this kind of shock, the
unadjusted Taylor rule makes policy slightly too loose, as previously shown in Figure
14. But credit contracts in response to this shock, so a rule of the form (3.9) with
φb > 0 would be even worse. One can in fact better approximate optimal policy in
response to this shock if φb is slightly negative. However, the optimal value of φb is
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quite small, much less negative than -.025 (the smallest negative coefficient for which
we plot the responses), so there is little gain from this kind of adjustment to the
simple Taylor rule.
Similar remarks apply to the case of an increase in the demand of savers (not
shown). Responding to credit is even less useful in the case of an increase in the
demand of borrowers (Figure 25). In the case of this kind of shock, the unadjusted
Taylor rule makes policy too tight (as shown in Figure 21), but credit increases, so
again a negative value of φb would be needed to adjust policy in the right direction.
Moreover, in this case there is a problem similar to the one demonstrated in Figure
23: a negative value of φb that is large enough to prevent the undesired initial decline
in inflation at the time of the shock will then be too stimulative in later periods,
and will at the same time not stimulate output enough in the first year following
the shock (unless it is so large as to be quite inflationary even initially). Again the
problem is that credit responds in too delayed and too persistent a way to be an
ideal indicator of the required adjustment, even when the sign is reversed from the
conventional advice.
In other cases, responding to aggregate credit does little to improve the defects
of the simple Taylor rule. Figure 26 shows the equilibrium responses to a technology
shock under the same set of alternative policies. In this case, as in the one just dis-
cussed, the unadjusted Taylor rule prescribes policy that is too tight, while private
credit grows strongly in response to the shock. Thus a negative value of φb is needed
to improve upon the unadjusted rule. However, the modest negative values of φb con-
sidered in the figure are insufficient to prevent policy from continuing to be much too
tight. (Similar results are obtained in the case of other types of “supply” disturbances
— a shock to the disutility of working, a shock to the tax rate, or a wage markup
shock — though these figures are not shown here.) We could consider much larger
negative values of φb, but such a policy rule would be highly destabilizing in the case
of any of the “demand” disturbances considered in the previous two paragraphs. And
even in the case of the technology shock, no value of φb would approximate optimal
policy well, because the dynamics of the required adjustment of policy would not
match the dynamics of credit, as in Figure 23.
Thus there seems little advantage in modifying the Taylor to include a response
to aggregate credit of the kind proposed in (3.9). To the extent that there is any
advantage to responding to credit, improvement of the equilibrium responses to “non-
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financial” disturbances would require a negative value of φb, rather than the positive
value that would correspond to seeking to stabilize aggregate credit.67 Even such
advantages as may be associated with a negative φb (as in the case illustrated in
Figure 24) can be as well achieved by a spread-adjusted Taylor rule (recall Figure
20), and the spread-adjusted Taylor rule has the advantage of also prescribing the
right direction of adjustment in the case of a “financial shock.” But the flexible
inflation targeting rule better approximates optimal policy than any rule in either of
these simple families of modified Taylor rules, since in the case of rules of the latter
sorts, the optimal adjustment coefficient is quite different depending on the type of
disturbance considered.
4 Provisional Conclusions
The present analysis represents merely a first attempt at exploration of what is obvi-
ously a very rich terrain. Among other obvious limitations of the present analysis, we
have allowed for only one, very simple form of possible endogeneity of credit spreads.68
Further analysis will be necessary before we can judge how robust the conclusions
of the present analysis are to variations in this aspect of our model of the monetary
transmission mechanism. Nonetheless, it may be useful to summarize some of the
provisional conclusions suggested by our results.
67The fact that in each of these cases a somewhat negative value of φb would be better than any
positive value is not accidental. It is an implication of our observation, in the previous section,
that it is quite generally desirable to reduce the Taylor rule intercept in response to an increase in
credit spreads. Since in the case of the convex intermediation technology (assumed again in this
section), credit spreads increase if and only if credit increases (in the case of any of the non-financial
disturbances), an adjustment equivalent to a “spread-adjusted Taylor rule” requires that φb < 0.
However, the required sign of the response to credit is reversed in the case of a “financial shock,”
since in this case a shock that increases credit spreads reduces credit.
68For example, we abstract from both from the possible dependence of loan rates on borrowers’
net worth stressed in the “financial accelerator” model of Bernanke et al. (1999) and from the
stickiness of loan rates stressed by Hulsewig et al. (2007), Teranishi (2008), Sudo and Teranishi
(2008), and Gerali et al. (2008).
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4.1 Implications for Models for Policy Analysis
With regard to the most general question raised in our introduction, our results sug-
gest that the basic view of the way in which monetary policy influences aggregate
expenditure and inflation presented in New Keynesian models need not be modified
in any fundamental way as a consequence of the observation that substantial spreads
exist on average between different interest rates in the economy, or that these spreads
are not always constant over time. We have exhibited a simple extension of the basic
NK model in which a time-varying positive spread exists between the interest rate
available to savers and the interest rate at which borrowers can borrow. Yet in at
least the simplest version of this model, the monetary transmission mechanism is
virtually identical to that of the basic NK model: monetary policy can be viewed
purely as central-bank control of a short-term nominal interest rate (the deposit rate
idt ), and the ways in which aggregate expenditure and inflation are determined by the
expected central-bank reaction function for the policy rate (e.g., a Taylor rule speci-
fication) are nearly identical to those in the basic NK model. Hence the fundamental
lessons implied by that framework for monetary policy analysis continue to apply (for
example, the conclusion that central banks influence the aggregate economy primarily
by affecting the expected future path of short-run real rates of return, rather than
through their control of the current short rate as such, the conclusion that optimal
policy is history-dependent, and so on).
This does not mean that financial frictions are irrelevant to output and inflation
determination. Even in the simplest case of the present model, time-variation in
credit spreads affects both the “IS relation” between the expected path of the real
policy rate and aggregate expenditure and the “AS relation” between aggregate out-
put and inflation. However, in the simplest version of the model, these spreads simply
contribute additional additive terms to these relations, corresponding to a new form
of exogenous disturbance, in addition to the real sources of variation in the natural
rate of interest and natural rate of output, and the “cost-push” disturbances allowed
for in the basic NK model. The occurrence of such additional disturbances matters:
successful monetary policy requires appropriate adjustment of the policy rate in re-
sponse to disturbances, and this requires monitoring them in real time and correctly
identifying their character as they occur. But the effects of “financial shocks” in the
simplest version of our model with credit frictions are not fundamentally different
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than the effects of a certain linear combination of types of shocks that are already
considered in the standard NK literature, and the appropriate response to them (from
the point of view of stabilization of inflation and/or real activity) is the same as would
be appropriate in the case of that combination of familiar shocks.
Among other things, allowing for credit spreads does not in any way require one to
reconsider the often-noted de-emphasis of measures of the money supply and sources
of money demand in standard NK models.69 We have shown that it is possible
to extend the basic NK model to incorporate time-varying credit frictions, without
making any reference to money or introducing a transactions role for money. This
can be interpreted as a “cashless” model in which there actually are no transactions
balances and no government liabilities that are held other than for their pecuniary
returns. But as usual, the model can also be interpreted as one in which money does
supply liquidity services and earns a correspondingly lower return than government
debt, and in which the central bank implements its interest-rate target by adjusting
the supply of money. It remains the case, under this latter interpretation, that what
matters about monetary policy is the intended reaction function for interest rates, and
not the adjustments of the supply of money that are required in order to achieve the
interest-rate targets, and that, under a plausible calibration of the size of monetary
frictions, the existence of such frictions is of negligible quantitative significance for
the predicted evolution of aggregate activity and inflation.
In particular, there is no intrinsic connection between monetary statistics and the
credit frictions in our model, so that a desire to track time variation in the credit
frictions does not provide any new justification for particular attention to monetary
aggregates. Of course, if we were to assume a mechanical proportionality between
some monetary aggregate and the volume of intermediation through the banking sec-
tor — as, for example, in the model of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), where
deposits are always in strict proportion to base money, owing to an always-binding
reserve requirement, the absence of uses for base money other than satisfaction of
69Critics of the omission of a fundamental role for monetary aggregates in NK models (e.g.,
Issing, 2006; Goodhart, 2007) often point to the absence of multiple interest rates and of any
role for financial intermediaries as a ground for suspecting the empirical relevance of such models.
Goodhart, in particular, proposes that the absence of financial frictions in such models may account
for the absence of an essential role for money: “by basing their model on [frictionless financial
markets], the Neo-Keynesians are turning their model into an essentially non-monetary model. So
it is no surprise that monetary variables are inessential in it” (p. 11).
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the reserve requirement, and the absence of sources of funding for banks that are not
subject to the reserve requirement — then that measure of money could be useful
for understanding aggregate conditions, to the extent that aggregate lending is an
important determinant of aggregate demand. Even in the world modeled by Good-
friend and McCallum, however, it is unclear why anyone should prefer to monitor
base money rather than bank credit (or aggregate bank liabilities) directly, unless
more direct measures are for some reason unavailable. And in a more realistic model
of banking under current conditions, the connection between the volume of finan-
cial intermediation and monetary aggregates is more tenuous. Indeed, there is no
conceptual necessity of any connection between money and financial intermediation
at all, as our model shows. Speaking of the importance of monitoring “money and
credit” (in the same breath) because of the importance of financial intermediation to
the economy appears to provide support for the traditional monetarist emphasis on
measures of the money supply, but in fact there is no reason to equate credit with
money. A proposal (as in the “monetary analysis” of the ECB) to track changes in
bank credit to the extent that it belongs among the “components and counterparts”
of a broad measure of the money supply might fortuitously result in attention to
some useful information, but not due to a sound understanding of what one should
be trying to measure.
There is a somewhat stronger case for attention to credit aggregates than monetary
aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy. Nonetheless, the mere observation that
credit frictions are important does not in itself make it obvious that policy should
be conditioned on the observed evolution of the volume of lending. In our model,
it is credit spreads that are of most direct significance as disturbance terms in the
structural equations of our model of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
In the simplest case, the part of the model that determines the evolution of aggregate
credit actually decouples from the block of equations that are needed to determine
the evolution of output and inflation. More generally, this is not true, but mainly
because of the possibility that credit spreads are endogenously affected by changes
in the volume of lending.70 In such a case, it would still seem more important to
monitor the endogenous variation in credit spreads in order to judge the appropriate
70Technically, the volume of financial intermediation can also be relevant to aggregate demand
determination owing to its implications for the resources consumed by the banking sector, but it is
not obvious that this should be quantitatively important.
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level for the policy rate, rather than to monitor the volume of lending (which would
be one among the several determinants of variation in those spreads).
While our results suggest that in the case of many types of aggregate distur-
bances (both disturbances that are ordinarily thought of as “demand” disturbances,
and others that are considered “supply” disturbances), the effects of shocks on the
evolution of output, inflation and interest rates under a conventional specification of
monetary policy are not too greatly changed by the introduction of credit frictions,
this is not uniformly the case. One example is the effects of changes in the path of
government debt owing to shifts in fiscal policy. While fiscal policy has no effects
on inflation, output or interest-rate determination in the basic NK model (if distort-
ing tax rates are assumed not to change, so that the changed path of government
borrowing corresponds only to a change in the time path of net lump-sum transfers
from the government) — that is, “Ricardian equivalence” obtains — in the presence
of credit frictions of the kind modeled here, this is no longer the case (even under
the special assumption about tax rates). This suggests that the integration of fiscal
variables into models used in central banks for monetary policy analysis may deserve
a higher place on the research agenda.
4.2 Implications for Monetary Policy
It is more difficult to draw definite conclusions about desirable monetary policies from
our analysis, as conclusions of this kind are likely to be sensitive to details of model
specification. We have nothing to say about the issue of how monetary policy decisions
should take into account financial stability concerns — either possible consequences of
interest-rate decisions for systemic risks to the financial sector, of the kind emphasized
by the US Federal Reserve in some of its decisions this year, or possible consequences
of interest-rate policy for risk-taking behavior, of the kind hypothesized by Borio
and Zhu (2007) — since we simply abstract from such concerns in our reduced-form
model of the financial sector. In principle, it should be possible to address concerns
of these kinds within our framework, by introducing more complex hypotheses about
the nature of endogenous variation in credit spreads, and we hope to pursue such an
investigation in future work. Here we are able only to shed light on the way in which
monetary policy should be affected by the magnitude of and time variation in credit
spreads, taking the evolution of credit spreads as a given, that monetary policy (in
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the sense of interest-rate policy) is not expected to influence.
In posing this relatively limited question, we do not mean to deny the importance
of central banks’ role as “lender of last resort.” However, contrary to some accounts,
we do not see an intrinsic connection between this dimension of central banking and
monetary policy (in the narrow sense of interest-rate control and control of the supply
of central bank balances for use in payments). It seems to us that the most important
way in which central banks reduce risks to financial stability is by extending credit to
financial institutions in distress, as in the case of the US Federal Reserve’s traditional
discount-window policy, or the new lending facilities created more recently; and lend-
ing of this kind need not imply either a reduction in the central bank’s interest-rate
target or an expansion of its balance sheet (as has generally been true of the fairly
aggressive lending by the Fed and ECB in recent months). While decisions about this
aspect of central-bank policy are important and sometimes quite subtle, they can be
considered in relative independence of a bank’s monetary policy objectives, and we
do not seek to say anything about them here. Instead, we take this dimension of
policy, with whatever consequences it may have for the evolution of credit spreads, as
given, and consider the proper conduct of monetary policy given the lending capacity
of the financial sector (represented by our assumptions about the “intermediation
technology” and “financial markup”).
Of course, even our conclusions about optimal interest-rate policy may well have
to be modified if one takes account of other possible sources of endogenous variation in
credit spreads; only replication of our analyses under additional variant assumptions
will be able to determine to what extent this may be true. Nonetheless, we find some
of the results from our analyses of alternative policies in the present simple model
quite suggestive. At the very least, these should provide hypotheses deserving of
further study in the context of more complex models. Probably the most interesting
of these results relate to the way in which monetary policy should take account of
variations in credit spreads.
It is often argued that widening credit spreads provide a prima facie case for the
appropriateness of lowering the central bank’s policy rate. The argument commonly
given is that when spreads increase, the terms on which it is possible to borrow are
tightened, even in the absence of any increase in the policy rate. If it was not desired
to tighten monetary conditions, it is therefore necessary to lower the policy rate, to
the extent required in order to preserve the original cost of borrowing. Authors such
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as McCulley and Toloui (2008) suggest a one-for-one reduction in the policy rate in
response to increases in particular credit spreads.
In our model, it is certainly right that the policy rate is not the only interest rate
that matters in assessing the degree to which financial conditions are expansionary.
We can, to a useful approximation, define an “average” interest rate such that aggre-
gate demand depends on the expected path of this average rate (relative to expected
inflation); and when credit spreads increase, this average rate will be higher relative
to the policy rate than under more ordinary circumstances. Hence it is necessary to
lower the policy rate in order to prevent financial conditions from tightening, in the
relevant sense. However, this argument alone would not justify lowering the policy
rate by the full amount of the increased spread, nor would it justify lowering it to the
extent necessary to keep the rate at which it is possible to borrow from rising. An
increase in credit spreads also causes the lending rate to rise relative to the average
rate, so that it is necessary for the lending rate to rise if financial conditions are not
to be loosened, in the sense that matters for aggregate demand and the generation
of inflationary pressure.
In the calibrated numerical examples considered in our paper, it is in some cases
desirable to lower the policy rate by the full amount of the increase in the spread
between the deposit rate and the lending rate; but in a number of cases a much smaller
adjustment would lead to a more nearly optimal policy, while in other cases, even an
adjustment several times as large as the increase in credit spreads would not suffice
to correct the bias associated with a simple Taylor rule. While we find that a spread
adjustment of the kind proposed by McCulley and Toloui would generally represent
the right direction of adjustment of policy, relative to a simple Taylor rule, the simple
adjustment that they suggest is not at all accurate as a guide to the magnitude of
adjustment that would be appropriate.
Still less would our model justify the view, which sometimes appears to be as-
sumed in popular discussions of the appropriate response to strains in credit markets,
that the persistence of higher-than-average credit spreads means that interest rates
have not been cut enough. (This is evidently what is assumed when commentators
seek to judge whether policy rates have been cut by the right amount by looking at
whether spreads remain unusually large, rather than asking whether borrowing rates
are actually high.)
It is true that an increase in spreads is a source of deadweight loss in our model,
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so that a reduction of spreads to normal levels, if this could be done without changing
anything else, would be desirable. But it is not necessarily true that monetary policy
can do anything to undo an increase in credit spreads — this is certainly the case
in our simplest model, where the credit spread is determined entirely by exogenous
factors — and lowering interest rates will instead certainly have collateral effects.
Even if monetary policy can influence spreads, it is not obvious that this will be
beneficial. For example, in the case that spreads are endogenous because they depend
on the volume of bank lending, monetary policy can lower spreads to the extent that
it can lead to a contraction of bank lending; but that would not necessarily increase
efficiency, even if a reduction in the spread associated with a given volume of lending
would enhance efficiency (by allowing more lending). A better principle may well be
to use monetary policy to mitigate the distortions caused by an increase in credit
spreads, to the extent that this is possible, rather than seeking to use policy to
influence the level of spreads as such.
We have also briefly considered the view that a policy rule that responds to
aggregate credit, in addition to inflation and real activity, will better stabilize the
economy in the case that credit frictions are important. We have found little support
for such a view, at least in the context of our model. In the case of “non-financial”
disturbances of a variety of types, our analysis indicates that a more nearly optimal
response to the disturbance than would result from a simple Taylor rule requires,
if anything, that the intercept of the Taylor rule be reduced when aggregate credit
increases — the opposite of the conventional advice, deriving from the idea that
monetary policy should seek to stabilize aggregate credit, in addition to inflation and
real activity. But in fact no rule that responds to aggregate credit has very desirable
properties, especially if the same response coefficient is assumed regardless of the
nature of the disturbance.
In fact, it is not obvious that one should expect to find any single variable (or
even a small number of variables) that, when added to a standard Taylor rule, will
provide a sufficient guideline for sound policy, regardless of the type of disturbances
to which an economy may be subject. Instead, as has often been argued in other
contexts, a policy prescription that specifies a target criterion that the central bank
should seek to ensure is projected to be satisfied at all time is likely to provide a
more robust description of good policy than a prescription for the bank’s reaction
function. For example, our simulations show (consistently with previous literature)
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that a Taylor rule does not always lead to desirable policy responses to disturbances,
even in the absence of financial frictions. It can hardly be expected, then, that
modifying the Taylor rule to properly take account of variation in spreads can solve
all of the problems with such a simple prescription.
A policy rule that directs the central bank to adjust its policy rate as necessary
to satisfy a “flexible inflation target” will automatically require the central bank to
adjust the policy rate to take account of changes in the severity of financial frictions,
without any need to modify the target criterion that the bank aims to conform with.
In our model of the transmission mechanism, it is the level and expected future path
of the average interest rate, rather than the policy rate, that determines whether
the evolution of output and inflation should satisfy the target criterion. When the
relation between this average rate and the policy rate changes owing to a change
in the size of interest-rate spreads, the level and expected path of the policy rate
required for conformity with the target criterion will obviously change. The required
policy rate will similarly change as a result of the effects of changing credit spreads
on the “IS relation” and aggregate-supply relation discussed in section 2.
When the policy rule is specified in terms of a target criterion, it is not obvious
that the target criterion that should be chosen depends much on the importance of
credit frictions. In a particularly simple case of a model with time-varying credit
frictions, we have shown that the optimal target criterion remains exactly the same
as in the basic NK model: the central bank should seek to stabilize a weighted average
of the inflation rate and the rate of growth of the output gap (or alternatively, to
stabilize an output-gap-adjusted price level). Under more general assumptions, this
exact equivalence does not obtain. Nonetheless, the target criterion that would be
optimal in the case of the model without credit frictions seems still to provide a
fairly good approximation to optimal policy in the model with credit frictions, when
these are parameterized to be of an empirically realistic magnitude. Because of the
advantages (for example, from the point of view of communication) of commitment to
a simple criterion, and because of the degree to which any attempt to refine the rule
would depend on fine details of the specification of the financial frictions, about which
there is likely to be uncertainty in any event, our results suggest that maintaining
a commitment to the same target criterion as would be optimal in the absence of
financial frictions is not a bad idea. This suggests that a central bank should not
change its target criterion — what it regards as acceptable paths of inflation and real
67
activity — at all in times of financial stress, but instead should take account of those
developments only as a result of the changes that they imply for the links between
the policy rate and the evolution of the target variables, and hence for the path of
the policy rate that is required to satisfy the target criterion.
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Figure 1: Marginal utilities of consumption for households of the two types. The




their corresponding steady-state marginal utilities.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 1 percent (annualized) shock to ²mt , in three different
models with a linear intermediation technology.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to At, in three different models with
a linear intermediation technology.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a shock to Gt equal to 1 percent of steady-state output,
in three different models with a linear intermediation technology.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a 1 percent (annualized) shock to ²mt , in three different
models with a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to At, in three different models with
a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to µwt , in three different models
with a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a shock to Gt equal to 1 percent of steady-state output,
in three different models with a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to type s expenditure, in three
different models with a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to a shock to bgt equal to 1 percent of steady-state
output, in three different models with a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to the same shock as in Figure 9, under a strict inflation
targeting policy.
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to At, under four alternative
monetary policies.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to µwt , under four alternative
monetary policies.
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Figure 14: Impulse responses to a shock to Gt equal to 1 percent of steady-state
output, under four alternative monetary policies.
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Figure 15: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to type s expenditure, under four
alternative monetary policies.
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Figure 16: Impulse responses to a shock to µbt that increases ωt(b) by 1 percentage
point (annualized) for each value of b, under four alternative monetary policies.
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Figure 17: Impulse responses to the same “financial shock” as in Figure 16, under
alternative spread-adjusted Taylor rules.
89






































Figure 18: Impulse responses to a shock to bgt equal to 1 percent of steady-state
output, under alternative spread-adjusted Taylor rules.
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Figure 19: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to type s expenditure, under
alternative spread-adjusted Taylor rules.
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Figure 20: Impulse responses to a shock to Gt equal to 1 percent of steady-state
output, under alternative spread-adjusted Taylor rules.
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Figure 21: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to type b expenditure, under
alternative spread-adjusted Taylor rules.
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Figure 22: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to At, under alternative spread-
adjusted Taylor rules.
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Figure 23: Impulse responses to the same kind of “financial shock” as in Figure 16,
under rules that respond to aggregate credit.
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Figure 24: Impulse responses to a shock to Gt equal to 1 percent of steady-state
output, under rules that respond to aggregate credit.
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Figure 25: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to type b expenditure, under rules
that respond to aggregate credit.
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Figure 26: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to At, under rules that respond to
aggregate credit.
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